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BROADENING THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL
GATEKEEPING: ADOPTING THE GOOD
FAITH DOCTRINE IN CLASS ACTION
PROCEEDINGS
ERAN B. TAUSSIGt
Without [invoking good faith a judge! might, in a particular
case, be unable to do justice at all, or he might be able to do it
only at the cost of fictionalizing existing legal concepts and rules,
thereby snarling up the law for future cases. In begetting snarl,
fiction may introduce inequity, unclarity or unpredictability. In
addition, fiction can divert analytical focus or even cast
aspersions on an innocent party.1
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article deals with the doctrine of "good faith" and its
application in class action proceedings in the United States
federal courts. Class actions have grown to play a vital role in
the American legal landscape and culture; they enable the
realization of claims that otherwise could never be litigated, no
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matter how meritorious they are.2 Their virtues, however, are
sometimes overshadowed by their shortcomings. A vast body of
literature has been written about the problems and abuses of the
class action procedure.' Among other problems, scholars lament
the extensive filing of meritless class actions in order to extort
unwarranted settlements and so-called "sweetheart settlements,"
in which class counsel colludes with the defendant to settle
meritorious claims for far less than they are worth in exchange
for greater fees than counsel would have expected had the parties
proceeded to trial.4
Even though modern class actions have existed in the United
States since 1966,1 no satisfactory solutions to the abuses of this
procedure have been developed. This Article attempts to address
this gap by describing and evaluating a solution that has not
been applied in the United States: the good faith concept. The
focus will be mainly on class actions seeking monetary relief
facilitated by Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.6
The absence of a good faith prerequisite in Rule 23 is,
perhaps, the most prominent distinction between American and
Israeli class action procedure. Unlike Rule 23, the recently
enacted Israeli Class Actions Law includes a good faith
requirement as one of the prerequisites to certification of a claim
2 See Deborah R. Hensler & Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Beyond "It Just Ain't Worth
It": Alternative Strategies for Damage Class Action Reform, 64 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 137, 145-46 (2001) ("[O]ne of the key purposes of collective action [is to
facilitate] litigation precisely when many persons have suffered, as a result of
another's wrongdoing, losses that are too modest to allow them to obtain individual
counsel.").
See, e.g., Sylvia R. Lazos, Note, Abuse in Plaintiff Class Action Settlements:
The Need for a Guardian During Pretrial Settlement Negotiations, 84 MICH. L. REV.
308, 309-10 (1985).
' See Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, "Sweetheart" and "Blackmail" Settlements
in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1377-78 (2000).
The 1966 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have
dramatically changed the use of group litigation. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The
Class Action in American Securities Regulation, 4 ZZPINT 321, 321, 323 (1999).
' For the reader's convenience, the text of the rule reads:
A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if ... (3) the
court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and
that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and
efficiently adjudicating the controversy.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). The other two kinds of class actions are entrenched in Rules
23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2). Id. at 23(b)(1), (2).
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as a class action., The class action procedure reflects the
differences between Israeli and American approaches to the
concept of good faith, and provides an interesting lens through
which to explore the different impact of the substantive aspects
of the law.
This Article examines whether and, if so, how the American
legal system attempts to achieve some of the same substantive
results as those sought by the use of good faith in the Israeli
system. This Article contends that federal class actions would
better achieve their goals if a good faith prerequisite were
adopted. While doing so, it considers both the larger legal and
socio-political contexts-specifically the role that litigation plays
in American and in Israeli societies. Arguably, the differences in
the role that litigation plays in the two societies may affect the
role that a "good faith" requirement can usefully play in both.
Part II of this Article briefly outlines the merits of class
actions and the major problems inherent to these proceedings.
Part III explores the main mechanisms created in the United
States to solve class action problems and examines whether they
are successful. Part IV begins by describing the role that good
faith plays in Israeli class action proceedings. It then describes
how good faith is sporadically used in parallel American
proceedings. In order to do that, this Part offers concise
introductions to class actions in Israel and to the implementation
of the general good faith doctrine in the United States. Part V
examines some of the key differences between the American and
Israeli legal systems, specifically, the different role that litigation
plays in each society, which may or may not justify the
differences concerning the usage of good faith in class action
proceedings. Part VI of this Article addresses the questions of
whether and to what extent the American legal system achieves,
by current Rule 23 prerequisites, the same goals as are achieved
by the Israeli good faith requirement. Put differently, this Part
attempts to answer the question of whether the good faith
concept can add value when used as a condition precedent for the
certification of a class action. Through this process, this Article
considers how such a concept could be incorporated into the
current procedure.
7 See Eran B. Taussig, Comment, Prerequisites to Class Action Certification: A
Comparison of New Israeli Law and Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 5 U. PA. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 3:1, 3:14 (2007).
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II. MERITS AND DRAWBACKS OF CLASS ACTIONS
Ample commentary has been written about the drawbacks of
class actions.' As discussed later in this Article, some of the
criticism leveled against this important procedure is overstated.
Before addressing some of this criticism, it is appropriate to take
up briefly the merits of class actions. Class actions have broad
social and economic significance. They facilitate access to courts
in a society that depends upon private litigation for the
enforcement of important social norms.9 While it is true that
class action proceedings protect the interests of individuals who
have been harmed, but have not bothered to institute a claim,10
class actions also serve the important public purpose of providing
a mechanism for the enforcement of the law in various regulatory
regimes. Class actions warn against the violation of the law,
save resources, and prevent multiple claims. Their primary
purpose is to compel compliance with legal norms through the
threat of legal sanctions if these norms are not adhered to and, of
course, through the imposition of such sanctions when
necessary.
12
Class action proceedings aim to overcome the problem that
small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to
file a personal claim.1 Even in economically viable claims not
See, e.g., Joshua D. Blank & Eric Zack, Dismissing the Class: A Practical
Approach to the Class Action Restriction on the Legal Services Corporation, 110
PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 14-17 (2005).
Burbank, supra note 5, at 321.
Rule 23(b)(3) class actions may be the most important kind of class action
because they enable those with small claims for whom individual litigation would be
economically irrational to band together in group litigation against a common
adversary. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985); Stephen
B. Burbank & Linda J. Silberman, Civil Procedure in Comparative Context: The
United States of America, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 675, 684 (1997).
" See Ilana T. Buschkin, Note, The Viability of Class Action Lawsuits in a
Globalized Economy-Permitting Foreign Claimants To Be Members of Class Action
Lawsuits in the U.S. Federal Courts, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1563, 1564-65 (2005).
12 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on
Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1536 (2006).
13 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) ("The policy at the
very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small
recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action
prosecuting his or her rights." (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338,
344 (7th Cir. 1997))). See also Hensler & Rowe, supra note 2 ("[O]ne of the key
purposes of collective action [is to facilitate] litigation precisely when many persons
have suffered, as a result of another's wrongdoing, losses that are too modest to
allow them to obtain individual counsel.").
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joined as a class action, the defendant can take advantage of
economies of scale; that is, he or she can invest more in case
preparation and expert witnesses.14 If the defendants foresee a
lot of similar claims that will follow, it is worthwhile for them to
spend more on proving common questions. 15 This is true even in
large claims such as tort claims, in which defendants will
outspend the plaintiffs on common issues, unless the claims are
aggregated.16 This foils the law's general objectives of deterrence
and compensation. 17 This is why, in harnessing lawyers' private
pursuit of contingency fees, class actions have promoted the
common good by taking law enforcement out of the state's hands
and putting it in the hands of "private attorneys general."'"
These lawyers spot potential legal violations, identify individuals
to serve as named plaintiffs, and file class actions on behalf of
a class of similarly situated individuals. 9 If they win, they
obtain a percentage of the total payment made by defendants; if
they lose, they bear the litigation expenses.2" Since the
representative plaintiffs lawyer can spread his investment over
all of the claims-similarly to the defendant's lawyer-it becomes
possible to make investments in the litigation that the plaintiff
" See Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 1379.
15 See id. at 1384.
" See, e.g., David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions: What Defendants Have
and Plaintiffs Don't, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393, 394-95 (2000).
1 See Coffee, supra note 12, at 1548; Hensler & Rowe, supra note 13, at 137-38.
On the objectives of class actions, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
THE LAW 615 (2007) ("[W]hat is most important from an economic standpoint is that
the violator be confronted with the costs of his violation-this preserves the
deterrent effect of litigation-not that he pay them to his victims.").
" See generally Jeremy A. Rabkin, The Secret Life of the Private Attorney
General, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 179, 179-84 (1998) (providing an interesting
historical overview of the term "private attorney general"). It should be mentioned
that critics view enforcement via "private attorney general" as illegal. See S. REP.
No. 109-14, at 58-59 (2005). Others argue that public enforcement is still critical to
achieve the best results in terms of enforcement and deterrence. See Howell E.
Jackson & Mark J. Roe, Public and Private Enfbrcement of Securities Laws:
Resource-Based Evidence 1 (Harvard Pub. Law Working Paper No. 08-28, 2009),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1000086.
19 See Carl W. Hittinger & Jarod M. Bona, The Diminishing Role of the Private
Attorney General in Antitrust and Securities Class Action Cases Aided by the
Supreme Court, 4 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 167, 168 (2009).
2 See Katie Melnick, Note, In Defense of the Class Action Lawsuit: An
Examination of the Implicit Advantages and a Response to Common Criticisms, 22
ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 755, 765-66 (2008).
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could not make if the claims were filed independently. 21 Simply
put by former United States Supreme Court Justice Douglas,
"[t]he class action is one of the few legal remedies the small
claimant has against those who command the status quo."22
Class actions also help gain efficiency and save costs.
23
Efficiency is achieved by the joinder of many claims with similar
facts against the same defendants. 24  Thus, courts are not
compelled to deal with every claim separately, and valuable
judicial time is conserved. Moreover, class actions obtain
uniform decisions, reduce the risk of multiplicity of findings, and,
therefore, bring stability to the judicial system.25
Class actions achieve equality between plaintiffs: Without
class actions, a plaintiff who files or collects first would be in a
better situation than a peer who files a claim at a later date
when the defendant's finances have diminished. Class actions
ensure that similarly situated plaintiffs receive the same
compensation.26
Class action procedure also deals with the social interest in
defending the rule of law. To deter potential violations of the
law, it is imperative that defendants who violate the law be
sanctioned. In other words, class actions assist in norm
enforcement, whereas, without class action suits, these norms
would be violated with impunity due to a lack of incentive to file
an individual suit.27 Since public agencies, both in Israel and the
United States, lack sufficient financial resources to monitor and
21 The economy of scale problem remains to some extent because even in class
action proceedings, class counsel does not get the whole recovery but a mere
percentage of it. This means that the defendant still has an incentive to outspend
the class counsel. See, e.g., Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 1385-86.
22 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 186 (1974).
22 See, e.g., Greenfield v. Villager Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 831 (3d Cir. 1973).
24 See Christopher Smithka, Article, From Budapest to Berlin: How
Implementing Class Action Lawsuits in the European Union Would Increase
Competition and Strengthen Consumer Confidence, 27 WIS. INTL L.J. 173, 175
(2009).
2, See, e.g., U.S. Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 402-03 (1980).
26 See generally Parker v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 239 F.R.D. 318, 338-39
(E.D.N.Y. 2007) (explaining the rationale for equal distribution among similarly-
situated plaintiffs, along with the rare circumstances in which "asymmetrically
allocated damage awards may be justified").
2 The significance of private enforcement has been widely disucssed in legal
scholarship. See, e.g., Lisa L. Casey, Reforming Securities Class Actions from the
Bench: Judging Fiduciaries and Fiduciary Judging, 2003 BYU L. REV. 1239,
1247-50.
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detect all wrongdoing or to prosecute all violators, class actions
are needed to fill this gap."8  This is why class actions add an
important dimension to regulatory enforcement. 29 As discussed
in detail below, the United States uses ex post regulation, as
opposed to heavy ex ante constraints, far more than most
European countries.30 This choice necessitates the wide scope of
class actions.
In addition to the benefits of ex post enforcement, class
actions produce "spillovers "3 '-positive externalities-that
provide public advantages such as information sharing between
plaintiffs' attorneys, accountability of both corporations and the
entities that regulate them, and transparency of the judicial
process.A They also produce innovative legal theories,
sophisticated damage models, and other innovations that are
propelled by entrepreneurial class representatives and class
counsel.33
To sum up, class actions benefit the public and society when
they integrate private actors into ex post enforcement. However,
class actions have been repeatedly criticized for allowing class
attorneys to appropriate more than their rightful shares of the
common fund and for providing much less compensation and
deterrence than alleged.34  The image of class actions in the
media, and therefore in peoples' minds, is of a mechanism
created for lawyers' personal profit and not as a means of
achieving public good.3' Commentators and courts have also
28 See, e.g., Moshe Bar-Niv (Boronovski), The Boundary of Consumer Class
Action, 19(1) YIUNEY MISHPAT 251, 253 (1994); Samuel Issacharoff, Group Litigation
of Consumer Claims: Lessons from the U.S. Experience, 34 TEX. INT'L L.J. 135, 136
(1999); Paul M. Barrett, Civil Action: Why Americans Look to the Courts To Cure the
Nation's Social Ills, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 2000, at Al.
29 DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC
GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 69-71 (RAND 2000).
30 See infra text accompanying notes 179-184, 266-274, 280-284.
See generally Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 257 (2007) (describing the connection between spillovers and the
law).
12 See Elizabeth Chamblee Bureh, Securities Class Actions as Pragmatic Ex Post
Regulation, 43 GA. L. REV. 63, 67 (2008).
" See id.
14 See, e.g., HENSLER ET AL., supra note 29, at 119-20, 434-37 (comparing
attorney fees with payouts to class members).
" See Deborah R. Hensler, Revisiting the Monster: New Myths and Realities of
Class Action and Other Large Scale Litigation, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 179, 180
(2001) ("Many ordinary Americans seem to think that class actions are a
new-fangled litigation device invented by greedy plaintiff attorneys."); see also
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lamented the lack of communication that often arises between
class action lawyers and absent members of the class whom they
purport to represent.36 Various scholars describe class actions as
a "Frankenstein monster."37 Eminent jurists such as Henry
Friendly and Richard Posner warn that unscrupulous plaintiffs
can leverage the class action device to extract "blackmail
settlements" from defendants.3"
The problems created by the class action procedure can be
divided into three categories according to different standpoints:
the defendant's standpoint, the represented class's standpoint,
and the judiciary's standpoint-which reflects the interests of the
public at large.39
Viewed from the defendant's standpoint, class actions are
sometimes filed for ulterior motives such as extortion, collusion,
interference with competition, and hostile takeover. Frivolous
lawsuits may thus be employed to pressure a defendant to
compromise, even when that same defendant would have
prevailed at trial.4° Given such a scenario, a defendant will often
Editorial, Restoring Class to Class Actions, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 2002, at A22 ("At
settlement time, the lawyers cash in, while the 'clients' get coupons for product
upgrades.").
"' See Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont'l Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chi., 834 F.2d
677, 678 (7th Cir. 1987) ("Class actions differ from ordinary lawsuits in that the
lawyers for the class, rather than the clients, have all the initiative and are close to
being the real parties in interest. This ... generates a host of problems."); see also
John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1346 (1995) ("[I]ndividual plaintiffs have weak to nonexistent
control over their attorneys across the mass tort context for reasons that are
inherent to the economics of mass tort litigation.").
" Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth,
Reality, and the "Class Action Problem," 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 665 (1979) (quoting
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 572 (2d Cir. 1968)).
8 See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298-300 (7th Cir.
1995) (Judge Posner quoting Judge Friendly); HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 120 (Columbia Univ. Press 1973). Similar views
were expressed by other judges, such as Judge Easterbrook. See In re
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1016-17 (7th Cir. 2002); West v.
Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 937 (7th Cir. 2002).
" See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, § 2(a)(2)
(listing Congress's findings and purposes regarding the Class Action Fairness Act).
" See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996)
("[Cilass certification creates insurmountable pressure on defendants to settle,
whereas individual trials would not."). According to a RAND study, the ex ante goal
of most class action plaintiffs is to reach a settlement. See HENSLER ET AL., supra
note 29, at 93-94. Moreover, some legal counsels of big corporations admitted that
they were negotiating with lawyers who approached them with offers for cheap
settlements in return for agreements not to challenge fee requests. Id. at 93.
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make the economic choice to pay in order to minimize his or her
costs.41 Defendants are sometimes ready to pay to prevent
damage to their reputations, even if the claim is without merit.
This strategy thwarts two of the main goals of class action
proceedings: enforcing the law and deterring its breach.4
2
Frivolous class actions may obtain larger settlements than
plaintiffs would have obtained at regular trials.43  This
phenomenon arises mainly from the extensive discovery process
imposed upon defendants under federal law, regardless of
whether or not the suit has merit,44 and from the fact that the
initial costs of class action management are higher for the
defendant than for the plaintiff.45 Discovery enables the class
counsel to harass defendants to the point of disrupting day-to-day
management of a defendant corporation.4" It is thus apparent
that some class actions are filed with no intention to go to trial
and obtain a final judgment, but instead to intimidate the
defendant into settling the claim. The lack of connection between
the merit of the claim and the damage sustained on the one
hand, and the agreed settlements on the other hand, frustrates
the purposes underpinning class actions. Both extortionate class
actions, which raise considerably the liability of defendants who
41 This may ultimately damage the entire public, for example, when the class
compensation payments are passed on to the public.
" See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Payment of Expenses in Securities Class Actions:
Ethical Dilemmas, Class Counsel, and Congressional Intent, 22 REV. LITIG. 557, 579
(2003) (discussing the policies and functions of Rule 23).
" This phenomenon can be explained via the theory that posits that the decision
frame in frivolous litigation induces risk-seeking behavior in plaintiffs and risk-
averse behavior in defendants. According to this theory, "[p]laintiffs in frivolous
litigation ... are psychologically inclined toward trial, while defendants in frivolous
litigation are psychologically inclined toward settlement." Chris Guthrie, Framing
Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 163, 168 (2000). In
addition, "[b]ecause plaintiffs in frivolous suits have a greater tolerance for risk than
the defendants they have sued, the plaintiffs have 'psychological leverage' in
settlement negotiations." Id. at 191.
44 Tim Oliver Brandi, The Strike Suit: A Common Problem of the Derivative Suit
and the Shareholder Class Action, 98 DICK. L. REV. 355, 370 (1993).
15 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The
Implications of Economic Theory /br Private En/brcement of Law Through Class and
Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 677 (1986). According to the "American
rule," under which each litigant pays his or her own attorney fees regardless of the
outcome, plaintiffs have less to lose when filing a class action. This may play into the
calculations of lawyers considering whether to bring frivolous lawsuits.
46 See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975).
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follow the law, and decrease settlements reached for meritorious
claims,47 undercut the potential deterrence value of class action
lawsuits.48
Class actions are also problematic from the standpoint of the
represented members of the class. First, in an adversarial legal
system, every litigant is entitled to his day in court. Certifying a
claim as a class action means denying the right of every plaintiff
to choose his own counsel and to file an individual claim.49 Since
the absent members of the class are bound by the class action's
outcome, 50 an inappropriate use of this mechanism may harm
their rights. 51  This is less problematic in "negative value" class
actions, where individual plaintiffs do not have an economically
viable claim.2
" This occurs when class counsel colludes with the defendants. See infra text
accompanying notes 65-67 (discussing these types of situations).
41 HENSLER ET AL., supra note 29, at 79. It should be noted that limited
empirical evidence exists pertaining to deterrence achieved by class actions. See, e.g.,
Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 416 (1999)
("Empirically, deterrence claims are speculative."); Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A.
Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and Evidence for Malpractice Reform,
80 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1604 (2002) ("Hard empirical evidence of [tort] deterrence is
indeed difficult to come by."). Professors Dewees and Trebilcock, however, "found
mixed evidence of deterrence." Id.
4' This issue purports to be solved by the opt-out opportunity, which is given to
the invidual plaintiffs by the certifying court. Clearly, when plaintiffs either do not
know about the damage or do not care about their personal claims, notice and
opportunity to opt-out are hardly important. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 5, at 325.
,O Class actions represent an exception to the rule that an absent party cannot
be bound by judgment in personam. As long as the named parties adequately
represent the absent class members, the judgment will bind the absent parties. See
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41-43 (1940); Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 561 F.2d
86, 89-90 (7th Cir. 1977) (quoting Nat'l Ass'n of Reg'l Med. Programs v. Mathews,
551 F.2d 340, 344-45 (D.C. Cir. 1976)); see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472
U.S. 797, 807-08 (1985) (prescribing due process requirements with respect to
jurisdiction over absent members of a plaintiff class action in state court).
" This is why several scholars have written that class actions have transformed
from being a sword for the harmed to a shield for the malfeasant. See, e.g., Coffee,
supra note 36, at 1350; Charles Silver, "We're Scared to Death": Class Certification
and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357, 1405 (2003) (discussing class actions' effect
in protecting defendants from bankruptcy).
2 See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
419-23 (Cambridge 2004); John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability:
Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 370,428-32 (2000).
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Another, potentially more significant problem, is the built-in
conflict of interest between the members of the class and the
class counsel,5 3 which stems from agency problems. 54  The class
counsel is interested in his or her contingency fee, while the
members of the class are interested in maximizing their
compensation.5 The result is a substantial gap between the
interests of the representatives and those of the absent class
members.56  An information gap also exists: Class counsel
obtains all the information, both factual and legal, and can better
assess the real value of the claim and the results of potential
litigation. Class counsel alone can estimate the cost of going to
trial. The disparity in information distribution leaves the
representative plaintiff and the absent members of the class
unable to monitor the counsel's decisions.' The named plaintiff
" According to Israeli law, in addition to his or her share of the settlements
proceeds, the named plaintiff is also entitled to a reward in case of a settlement or if
he or she wins at trial. Class Actions Law, 2006, S.H. 2054, p. 264, § 22 (trial); § 18
(settlement). Therefore, at least partly, there is also an integral conflict of interest
between the named plaintiff and the members of the class. In current federal
securities class actions the named plaintiff cannot receive any compensation above
what each other member of the class receives, other than costs and expenses. See
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1 (2006).
5 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintitfs' Attorney's Role in
Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for
Refbrm, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1991). There has been ample discussion
concerning the misalignment between the interests of the class counsel and those of'
absent members of the class. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 36, at 1442-43; Samuel
Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805, 830 (1997); Susan P.
Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. RE\. 1051, 1056
(1996).
55 See, e.g., Weinberger v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d 518, 524 (1st Cir.
1991) ("[Llawyers might urge a class settlement at a low figure or on a less-than-
optimal basis in exchange for red-carpet treatment on fees.").
5' Professors Macey and Miller suggested to solve this problem by an auction to
sell plaintiffs' rights to the highest bidder. Macey & Miller, supra note 54, at 6;
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Auctioning Class Action and Derivative
Suits: A Rejoinder, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 458, 460 (1993).
57 Judges experience similar problems when the class counsel and the
defendants jointly request the approval of a class action settlement. See, e.g.,
COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE
FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE, CIVIL, AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 52 (1996).
The court's Rule 23(e) obligation to review and approve a class settlement
commonly must surmount the informational difficulties that arise when the
major adversaries join forces as proponents of their settlement agreement.
Objectors frequently appear to reduce these difficulties, but it may be
difficult for objectors to obtain the information required for a fully informed
challenge.
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is sometimes considered to be a "figurehead""8 with the class
counsel being the real party in interest. The class action suit is
even named a "lawsuit without clients.'59  In these
circumstances, one cannot expect the named plaintiff to monitor
the class counsel's decisions.
The lack of confidence in the named plaintiffs supervisory
role over class counsel is magnified in decisions to settle: Unlike
in ordinary litigation, in which a client may override the lawyer's
decision and settle, in class actions the class counsel is the only
one who can launch a settlement, and he or she can do it without
the approval of the named plaintiff.6" The settlement needs to be
approved by the court, but even the court cannot force an
alternative settlement on the lawyer.61
Class counsel may prefer to minimize the costs incurred
by him or her in representation, as some may not be fully
reimbursed, even where the expected reimbursement for the
class exceeds these costs.6 2 This is so since class counsel bears all
the costs, yet enjoys only part of the returns.63 Class counsel
invests less than he would if he was the sole owner of the
proceeds from the class action or if he was directly and effectively
monitored by the owner and always paid to cover his costs. 4 If
Id.; see also Koniak & Cohen, supra note 54, at 1122-23; Jonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Miller, Judicial Review of Class Action Settlements, J. LEGAL ANALYSIS
179-83 (explaining why courts have limited capability to evaluate the value of
settlements).
" Jean Wegman Burns, Decorative Figureheads: Eliminating Class
Representatives in Class Actions, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 165, 165 (1990); Macey & Miller,
supra note 54, at 5; see also Richard H. Underwood, Legal Ethics and Class Actions:
Problems, Tactics and Judicial Responses, 71 KY. L.J. 787, 802 (1983). Professor
Coffee named representative plaintiffs "token figures." Coffee, supra note 52, at 384.
'9 James Wootton, The 1966 Amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23:
Frankenstein's Monster Comes to Life, in CLASS ACTIONS: PROTECTING CONSUMERS
OR BUILDING ATTORNEYS' NEST EGGS? 32 (Daren Bakst ed., 2001).
'o See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 29, at 75.
61 See, e.g., Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 726-27 (1986); In re Domestic Air
Transp. Antitrust Litig., 148 F.R.D. 297, 305 (N.D. Ga. 1993); MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.61 (2004).
62 Plaintiffs' lawyers are more risk averse than class members and may wish to
accept settlement offers that the members of the class may rationally wish to reject.
Coffee, supra note 52, at 390-91.
"' See generally Alon Harel & Alex Stein, Auctioning for Loyalty: Selection and
Monitoring of Class Counsel, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 69 (2004); Elliott J. Weiss &
John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors
Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053 (1995).
64 Issacharoff and Nagareda argue that even unconflicted class counsel might
simply do a bad job or might shirk and agree to an inadequate settlement to gain at
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some plaintiffs cannot monitor the actions of the class counsels,
and others just do not care, then in some "negative value" class
actions, the only one who cares is the entrepreneur-usually the
class counsel-since most of the members of the class do not care
about their claim or about obtaining compensation. 5
The weak monitoring of class counsel and the lack of
information in the hands of the represented plaintiffs sometimes
leads to the phenomena called "sweetheart settlements," in which
class counsel colludes with the defendant to settle meritorious
claims for far less than they are worth, in exchange for greater
fees than he or she would have expected had the parties
proceeded to trial.66 Sometimes this can also evolve into a
"reverse auction," "with the low bidder among the plaintiffs'
attorneys winning the right to settle with the defendant. '67 "The
least some fee award from the litigation. See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard A.
Nagareda, Class Settlements Under Attack, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1657, 1699
(2008).
65 See Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 433 P.2d 732, 740 (Cal. 1967); James D. Cox &
Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers: Empirical Evidence
and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions To Participate in
Securities Class Action Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV. 411, 413 (2005); James D. Cox
& Randall S. Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table: Do Institutional Investors Fail
To File Claims in Securities Class Actions?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 855, 870-71 (2002)
(noting that most of the institutional investors do not collect their settlement funds);
see also PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION 51 (proposed final draft,
Apr. 1, 2009) (on file with the American Law Institute).
"' See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation:
Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877,
883 (1987) (using the term "sweetheart settlement" to describe an arrangement "in
which the plaintiffs attorney trades a high fee award for a low recovery"); Hay &
Rosenberg, supra note 4; George L. Priest, Procedural Versus Substantive Controls of
Mass Tort Class Actions, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 521, 530-31 (1997) (recognizing the
sweetheart settlement as the "most basic concern" voiced by academic critics of the
class action). Sweetheart settlements have been widely documented in the context of
'settlement-only class actions" (class actions that are certified for the purpose of
settlement only). See generally Roger C. Cramton, Individualized Justice, Mass
Torts, and "Settlement Class Actions": An Introduction, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 811
(1995); Darren M. Franklin, The Mass Tort Defendants Strike Back: Are Settlement
Class Actions a Collusive Threat or Just a Phantom Menace?, 53 STAN. L. REV. 163
(2000); HENSLER ET AL., supra note 29, at 477-81.
17 Coffee, supra note 36, at 1354, 1370-73 ("[Reverse auction is] a jurisdictional
competition among different teams of plaintiffs' attorneys in different actions that
involve the same underlying allegations. The first team to settle with the defendants
in effect precludes the others .... "); see Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 1390-91;
Geoffrey P. Miller, Competing Bids in Class Action Settlements, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV.
633 (2003) (suggesting ex post competing bids as a mechanism to solve the "reverse
auction" problem); see also PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION 192
(proposed final draft, Apr. 1, 2009) (on file with the American Law Institute). The
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possibility of collusive settlements grows in direct proportion to
the attorney's 'independence' from his client.1
6 8
From the judiciary's standpoint, class actions prevent
duplicative claims, which may otherwise have to be dealt with in
different courts and lead to a multiplicity of results. 9 On the
other hand, class action proceedings are expensive for the judicial
system.7 ° When multiple frivolous class actions are filed, the
costs for the judiciary are immense.71 Even if most of those
claims end with settlement agreements, courts are still required
to check the fairness of the agreement and make sure it does not
harm the absent plaintiffs.72 This process takes a considerable
amount of time, let alone when class actions go to trial. In
addition to the fact that settlements in frivolous cases grow in
inverse proportion to the efficacy of the class action procedure,
expensive judicial time is being wasted on these frivolous
settlements instead of using it on other worthy lawsuits. Even
reverse auction phenomenon was dealt with recently by Judge Posner in Reynolds v.
Beneficial Nat'l Bank. 288 F.3d 277, 282-83 (7th Cir. 2002) ("Although there is no
proof that the settlement was actually collusive in the reverse-auction sense, the
circumstances demanded closer scrutiny than the district judge gave it."); see also
Crawford v. Equifax Payment Servs., 201 F.3d 877, 882 (7th Cir. 2000) (rejecting
class settlement because "Crawford and his attorney were paid handsomely to go
away; the other class members received nothing ... and lost the right to pursue
class relief'); Coffee, supra note 36, at 1367-83 (discussing the "new collusion" as
opposed to "old" collusive settlements).
68 John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of
the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 232 (1983); see
also Charles Silver, Class Actions-Representative Proceedings, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 194, 213-14 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds.,
2000) (detailing various forms of sweetheart settlements in class actions).
69 The burden of dealing with duplicative claims is true only under the
assumption that the members of the class would file individual claims. This is not
true in "negative value" class actions.
70 See, e.g., Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation,
Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 52 (1975). In certain
situations "judge[s] may understandably view the class action not as saving court
time but as consuming it." Id.
" The problem of instituting duplicative class actions is prevalent in the United
States. See THOMAS E. WILLGING & EMERY G. LEE III, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE
IMPACT OF THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 ON THE FEDERAL COURTS:
THIRD INTERIM REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
CIVIL RULES 24 (2007), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/cafa047.pdf/$file/
cafa0407.pdf (explaining that between July 1, 2001 and June 30, 2006,
approximately thirty-seven percent of class actions overlapped with or duplicated
other federal class actions). This was one of the justifications for the CAFA
enactment, discussed infra Part III.F. See also S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 23 (2005).
11 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
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when the claim is not frivolous, it may still cause manageability
problems, and may still not succeed in preventing multiple
litigations (for example, as a result of exclusions from the class). 73
Class actions have both vices and virtues. Controlled use of
the procedure advances worthy social interests, while its abuse
may damage both defendants and the absent members of a
represented class.74 As this Article discusses in the next section,
mechanisms that have been created in the United States to
reduce the potential problems with the procedure are inadequate.
III. MECHANISMS DESIGNED To SOLVE CLASS ACTIONS
PROBLEMS
This Part briefly reviews the means taken in order to curtail
certain perceived class action problems, mainly frivolous lawsuits
and "blackmail" settlements on the one hand, and collusion and
sweetheart class settlements on the other hand. This section
addresses: Rule 23(a) certification prerequisites and the
increased scrutiny of courts; Rule 23(e) and the approval of
settlements; the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
("PSLRA");75 heightened pleading standards and motions to
dismiss; and Rule 11 and the court's consideration of the merits
of the claim. It then examines the recent Class Action Fairness
Act of 2005 ("CAFA").76
Before describing these mechanisms, it is important to note
that recent scholarship suggests that some of the criticism
leveled against class actions might be exaggerated.77  An
empirical study determined that frivolous claims were often
found to be without merit and were terminated by rulings on
motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment, not by
settlements, coerced or otherwise. 78 The same study also found
" For a comprehensive discussion concerning judicial advantages and
disadvantages of class actions, see 2 HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA C. CONTE,
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, §§ 5:52-:56 (4th ed. 2002).
71 See, e.g., Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 171 (1989)
(quoting Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 100 (1981)).
75 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.).
76 Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
28 U.S.C.).
17 See infra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
71 See Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 To Address
the Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 177-78 (1996).
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that class counsel's fees were generally in the traditional range
and that the settlement rate for cases filed as class actions was
not much different than the settlement rate for civil cases
generally. 9  Hay and Rosenberg assert that the risks of
blackmail settlements have been overstated and suggest that
existing procedural mechanisms short of decertification provide
adequate protection against undue pressure.8 0 Coffee also rejects
what he calls "standard critiques of the class action ... [which
state] that securities class actions are frivolous and extortionate,
brought by legal shake-down artists seeking a quick payoff.""1 He
asserts that "the truly 'frivolous' securities class action is today
relatively rare. ' 2
That said, class action abuse should not be underestimated.
Due to the limits on the availability of state courts' data and the
rareness of current empirical studies about the abuse of class
actions in state courts, the extent of class action abuse is
unclear.8 3 Moreover, most of the scholars who underestimate
class action abuse only address one concern-frivolous lawsuits-
See id. According to recent securities litigation empirical analysis by Cox,
Thomas, and Bai, smaller settlements are more a product of the issuer's size and the
length of the class period than of the action's limited merit. See James D. Cox et al.,
There Are Plaintiffs and... There Are Plaintiffs: An Empirical Analysis of Securities
Class Action Settlements, 61 VAND. L. REV. 355, 380-84 (2008). According to another
empirical analysis, the settlement size of most securities claims closely correlates
with evidence of fraud. See Marilyn F. Johnson, Karen K. Nelson & A.C. Pritchard,
Do the Merits Matter More? The Impact of the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 627, 629-30 (2007).
" See Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 1378, 1381-82; see also Allan Kanner
& Tibor Nagy, Exploding the Blackmail Myth: A New Perspective on Class Action
Settlements, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 681, 693-98 (2005) (stating that available empirical
evidence suggests that "the Blackmail Myth fails to comport with factual reality");
David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions: What Defendants Have and Plaintiffs
Don't, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393, 430 (2000) (doubting "that litigation class
actions ... exert systematic blackmail pressure against defendants"); Warren F.
Schwartz, Long-Shot Class Actions: Toward a Normative Theory of Uncertainty, 8
LEGAL THEORY 297, 298 (2002) (arguing that the blackmail charge is unsupported);
Silver, supra note 51, at 1399-408 (stating that class actions appear to be no more
coercive than conventional lawsuits).
8 John C. Coffee, Jr., Accountability and Competition in Securities Class
Actions: Why "Exit" Works Better than "Voice," 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 407, 410 (2008).
See id.
See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519,
520 (1997); BOB NIEMIC & TOM WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., EFFECTS OF
AMCHEMIORTIZ ON THE FILING OF FEDERAL CLASS ACTIONS: REPORT TO THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 2 (2002), available at http://www.fjc.gov/
public/pdf.nsf/lookup/AmChem.pdf/$file/AmChem.pdf.
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and fail to address the other significant concerns such as
collusion. Coffee asserts in another article that class action
abuse still exists, even if it is different in nature or form. 4
Furthermore, most of these scholars address "strike suits" and
securities class action litigation. They do not address frivolous
and extortionate claims in other areas of the law. Indeed,
concern about frivolous class actions has inspired two of the most
significant procedural developments of the past two decades-the
PSLRA 5 and CAFA. 6  As this Article demonstrates, the means
that were taken to curb class action abuse in the federal court
system are ineffective.
A. Rule 23 Certification Prerequisites and Courts' Increased
Scrutiny
In 1966, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures 7
was extensively amended and, in doing so, the "modern" class
action came to life. Rule 23(a) contains several requirements,
each of which must be satisfied before any federal class action
can be certified. In addition, a proposed class action must satisfy
at least one of the elements of Rule 23(b).88 This certification
procedure is intended to protect the rights of the parties,
including the unnamed plaintiffs. The problems discussed
above are related mainly to claims certified under Rule 23(b)(3),
which permits certification of a claim when questions of fact or
84 See Coffee, supra note 36, at 1367, 1373-84; see also Coffee, supra note 81, at
413.
1 See David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 913, 939 n.68 (1998) (stating that the PSLRA "was evidently designed
to help curb perceived abuses in such litigation ... by trying to assure proper
monitoring of plaintiffs' counsel by a shareholder with the interest and capacity to
keep a close watch on the case"); Richard H. Walker & J. Gordon Seymour, Recent
Judicial and Legislative Developments Affecting the Private Securities Fraud Class
Action, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1003, 1023 (1998) (stating that the PSLRA "[wasi designed
to prevent abuses of federal securities class action lawsuits").
"I H.R. REP. No. 109-007, at 3 (2005) ("Over the past decade, there have been
abuses of the class action device that have-(A) harmed class members with
legitimate claims and defendants that have acted responsibly .... ). President Bush
also remarked that "lawyers went home with huge pay-outs, while the plaintiffs
ended up with coupons worth only a few dollars." White House Press Release,
President Signs Class-Action Fairness Act of 2005 (Feb. 18, 2005), available at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050218-11.
html.
17 FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
"' Id. 23(b).
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law common to the a group of litigants "predominate" over
individualized issues and adjudication of the lawsuit as a class
action would be the fairest and most efficient manner of resolving
the controversy.89
Rule 23(a)'s prerequisites are colloquially referred to
as numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of
representation.90 For the purposes of this Article, it suffices to
mention that both courts and commentators have suggested that
the adequacy of the representation prerequisite and the
certification procedure as a whole are intended to protect the
absent members of the class, who are bound by the final
judgment of the class action.91 The court is required to monitor
the proceedings, make sure the claim continues to meet the
prerequisites of class actions, and protect the rights of the absent
members of the class. Under Rule 23(a)(4), a court must find
that "the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class. 92  The adequacy of representation
prerequisite encompasses two separate questions: (1) whether
any substantial conflicts of interest exist between
the representatives and the class; and (2) whether the
representative will adequately prosecute the action, 93 through
vigorous representation and competency of the representative
" See id. 23(b)(3).
9' See, e.g., William H. Baker, Class Action Arbitration, 10 CARDOZO J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 335, 353 (2009).
" See, e.g., HENSLER ET AL., supra note 29, at 484. Rule 23 prerequisites were
widely discussed in commentaries. See, e.g., Debra Lyn Bassett, When Reform Is Not
Enough: Assuring More than Merely "Adequate" Representation in Class Actions, 38
GA. L. REV. 927, 930-34 (2004) (discussing adequacy of representation); Marcel
Kahan & Linda Silberman, The Inadequate Search /br 'Adequacy" in Class Actions:
A Critique of Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765, 787-88 (1998) (same);
Michael C. Protos, An Epistemological Approach to Class Certification: A Classy
Understanding of the Problems of Class Certification, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1297,
1312-18 (1992) (discussing the commanality prerequisite); Patrick Woolley,
Rethinking the Adequacy of Adequate Representation, 75 TEX. L. REV. 571, 572
(1997) (discussing adequacy of representation within the context of due process).
92 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-46 (1940) (discussing the requirement
of adequate representation); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir.
1968) (determining for the first time the test for Rule 23(a)(4)); see also Phillips
Petroleum Co., v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) (reiterating that named plaintiff
must adequately represent absent class members).
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and class counsel.94  The importance of the "adequacy of
representation" prerequisite is evident from the large body of
case law that has developed the standards for adequacy.1
Critics of class actions do not believe that Rule 23
prerequisites are capable of preventing class action abuses. This
is why the Rules Advisory Committee amended Rule 23 to make
the certification and winning of 23(b)(3) class actions less likely.96
The amendments include: (1) the addition of a provision for
interlocutory appeal of class certification; and (2) the addition of
Rule 23(g) as part of the 2003 revisions to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 97  which provides specific criteria that
courts need to consider in the appointment of class counsel.98
Furthermore, federal courts have used increased resistance to
prevent abuse of the class action procedure. 9 By imposing more
rigorous certification standards, federal courts have refused
certification in a larger number of cases. 100 Coffee states that
"new barriers have arisen across a variety of contexts where
formerly class certification had seemed automatic."'' A recent
"4 This definition seems to interrelate with the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. Bassett, supra note 91, at 962. Nevertheless, Bassett asserts that courts
tend to disregard these rules when considering certification either because they view
them as "primarily relevant to disciplinary proceedings [or because they] view
the ... Rules as largely inapplicable to class actions." Id.; see also FED. R. Civ. P.
23(g); Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 282 (7th Cir. 2002)
(concerning the adequacy of the proposed class counsel); Culver v. City of
Milwaukee, 277 F.3d 908, 915 (7th Cir. 2002) (same).
, See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997) (finding
that the inquiry into adequacy of representation "serves to uncover conflicts of
interest between named parties and the class they seek to represent"); Honsberr,
311 U.S. at 45 (rejecting representation as inadequate because it afforded
opportunities "for the fraudulent and collusive sacrifice of the rights of absent
parties"); Eisen, 391 F.2d at 562 ("[Ain essential concomitant of adequate
representation is that the party's attorney be qualified, experienced and generally
able to conduct the proposed litigation. Additionally, it is necessary to eliminate so
far as possible the likelihood that the litigants are involved in a collusive suit ...
6 HENSLER ET AL., supra note 29, at 28-29. Other changes, which also aimed to
limit class action filings, were never confirmed. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
17 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(A)-(B); FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee's notes.
98 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1). The rule also provides that the class counsel owes a
primary duty to the class as a whole. See id. at 23(g)(4).
" See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Abandoning the Federal Class Action Ship: Is
There Smoother Sailing for Class Actions in Gulf Waters?, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1709,
1712 (2000).
'0' Edward S. Purcell, The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old and
the New in Federal Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823, 1864 (2008).
'0' John C. Coffee Jr. & Stefan Paulovic, Class Certification: Developments over
the Last Five Years 2002-2007, 8 Class Action Litig. Rep. (BNA) S-787, at S-787 (Oct.
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ruling by the Third Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals added to
the line of cases requiring a more extensive inquiry into the class
certification requirements of Rule 23. In In re Hydrogen Peroxide
Antitrust Litigation,°2 a unanimous panel vacated the district
court's order certifying an antitrust class action and announced
stringent standards for class certification procedures. 113  Chief
Judge Scirica ruled that the decision to certify a class calls for
findings by the court, not merely a "threshold showing" by
a party, that each requirement of Rule 23 is met.1"4  He
added that a class certification decision requires a thorough
examination of the factual and legal allegations. Thus, he
concluded that "[c]ertification is proper only 'if the trial court is
satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites' of Rule
23 are met."1 5 The impact of this decision outside of the Third
Circuit and antitrust law remains to be seen.
106
B. Rule 23(e)-Approval of Settlements
The problems of class actions are at their worst in class
action settlements, particularly in settlement-only class actions.
As mentioned above, when the parties reach an agreement it is
difficult for the court to effectively scrutinize it and make sure
that its terms do not harm the rights of the absent members of
the class. This is why it was ruled in Amchem v. Windsor1" 7 that
when the court deals with settlement-only class actions, it does
not need to inquire as to if the case would present intractable
26, 2007); see also Coffee, supra note 81, at 431 ("Class action certification standards
have been significantly tightened across the spectrum of federal court litigation over
recent years, and, surprisingly, the most dramatic changes have been in the area of
securities class actions.").
102 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2008).
10' Id. at 307.
104 Id.
115 Id. at 309 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982)).
10' At the time of this Article's publication, this decision was cited in agreement
by district courts from the Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits. See In re
Healthsouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 257 F.R.D. 260, 272 (N.D. Ala. 2009); Chesner v.
Stewart Title Guar. Co., No. 1:06CV00476, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22446, *6 (N.D.
Ohio Feb. 24, 2009); Garcia v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 255 F.R.D. 678, 688 (D. Kan. 2009).
107 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
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problems of trial management-although other Rule 23
prerequisites for certification must still be satisfied.18 Rule 23(e)
is "an additional requirement, not a superseding direction."'10 9
Rule 23(e) was substantially expanded in 2003 to direct
courts on how to conduct an appropriate settlement review. The
rule now requires court approval in a fairness hearing, after
adequate notice to class members, and with the opportunity to
object to the settlement. When settlements are being considered,
the court has to make sure that the proposed settlement is "fair,
reasonable, and adequate."110  To do that, it must appraise the
expected recovery the class would likely obtain in trial-which is
equal to the potential judgment multiplied by the probability the
class would succeed, minus the expected litigation costs the class
attorney would have invested had the case proceeded to
judgment.111
There are reasons to believe that these measures are
not enough to impede self-dealing between class counsel and
defendants. This is why commentators criticize the process as
insufficiently protecting the absent members of the class.112 This
is especially true in "negative value" class actions, in which the
unnamed plaintiffs are unlikely to intervene since they usually
lack the incentives to come forward. 1 3 Therefore, judges depend
"' Id. at 609, 620. For situations requiring a higher level of scrutiny when
certification and settlement approval are sought simultaneously, see Warfarin
Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 534 (3d Cir. 2004), Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.,
150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998), and Weinberg v. Lear Fan Corp., 627 F. Supp.
719, 722 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). See also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 61,
§ 21.612; Coffee & Paulovic, supra note 101, at S-819.
109 Amchem, 521 U.S. at 621.
SFED, R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
. Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 285 (7th Cir. 2002).
112 See, e.g., HENSLER ET AL., supra note 29, at 86; see also Howard M. Downs,
Federal Class Actions: Diminished Protection for the Class and the Case for Reform,
73 NEB. L. REV. 646, 648 (1994) (criticizing the laxness of judicial review of class
settlements); Koniak & Cohen, supra note 54, at 1091-102 (emphasizing risks of
collusive settlements); Linda S. Mullenix, Taking Adequacy Seriously: The
Inadequate Assessment of Adequacy in Litigation and Settlement Classes, 57 VAND.
L. REV. 1687 (2004) (arguing that courts should improve their examination of the
adequacy of class representation at the certification and settlement stages).
11' This situation is exacerbated when dueling class actions are pending. See
Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. REV. 461, 474-83 (2000).
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on information presented by attorneys, whose self-interest is to
approve the settlement, and who therefore may not provide all
the information needed to assess the quality of the settlement.
114
Unlike inquisitorial civil law judges, who may instruct
parties to produce documents in their possession, examine
witnesses, and appoint experts,1 5 the paradigmatic common law
court is passive and relies exclusively on the adversary process.
11 6
Only the litigants, seeking to convince the court, are supposed to
provide the court with the necessary information. To be sure,
judges in class action litigation have taken more active roles,
instead of assuming the role of passive participant. 117 However,
up to this point, their procedural tools are still limited compared
to those wielded by civil law judges. In addition to this
institutional barrier, federal courts are overwhelmed by full
dockets. 1 8  Therefore, judges do not have the time or the
resources to investigate the quality of the settlement agreement
and whether it is reasonable for the members of the class.
114 For the same reasons, when judges consider class counsel's fees, they meet
with difficulties in assessing the value of the class counsel work. See, e.g., RICHARD
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 616-17 (7th ed. 2007).
"' See John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI.
L. REV. 823, 826-29 (1985) (discussing the differences between German procedure
and Anglo-American civil procedure).
116 See generally FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 1-2 (5th ed.
2001) (introducing general concepts of adversary systems).
117 Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281, 1286, 1313 (1976); Linda S. Mullenix, Lessons from Abroad: Complexity
and Convergence, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1, 13 (2001) ("[Plarticularly in the realm of
complex litigation, the American managerial judge has undertaken roles that are
indeed converging with the civil law inquisitorial judge."); Natalie C. Scott, Don't
Forget Me! The Client in a Class Action Lawsuit, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 561, 571
(2002).
11. According to an empirical study, the average reported time spent on civil
cases in federal courts is only 185 minutes per case. See JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL.,
RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE
MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 249 (1996). Also, in 2000, the
number of weighted filings per judgeship was 479 (up from 472 during 1999), of
which 311 were civil cases. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2000 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR 26-27 (2000). The situation may have worsened due to the enactment of
the Class Action Fairness Act, which produced an increase in filing in and removal
to federal courts. See Emery G. Lee & Thomas E. Willging, The Impact of the Class
Action Fairness Act on the Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Filings and
Removals, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1723, 1751 (2008).
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C. Rule 11 Sanctions and Inquiring into the Merits
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure offers
defendants a means to counterattack frivolous lawsuits. 119 In the
context of class actions, the rule obligates class counsel to certify
that, to the best of his or her knowledge and belief, the pleading
is not presented for an improper purpose, and that the claims
and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a
nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing
existing law, or for establishing new law. If a pleading does not
meet the Rule 11 standard, then the court may sanction the filing
attorney, the law firm, and the parties responsible for presenting
an improper submission.120 Usually the sanction imposed on the
offender is to pay the opposing party's costs,121 although non-
monetary sanctions are also available.'22 However, in most cases,
attempts to use Rule 11 as a basis for requesting denial of
certification do not succeed."' This is especially true since the
1993 amendment of Rule 11, which liberalized the rule.124
In addition to Rule 11, which was meant to prevent the filing
of meritless lawsuits, federal court judges now address issues
involving the merits of the claim before a lawsuit is certified. In
the past, application of the Rule 23 prerequisites was fairly
superficial, for all courts followed the Eisen ruling, which held
that Rule 23 conferred no "authority to conduct preliminary
I FED. R. Civ. P. 11; see Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal
Rule 11-Some "Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and
Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1315-16 (1986) (stating that the Rule was
promulgated to prevent baseless lawsuits). The differences in Rule 11 versions
before and after 1993 are discussed infra in Part IV.2.A.
120 FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c); see also Nelken, supra note 119, at 1315 ("[A] 'wilfull'
violation of the rule might also lead to 'appropriate disciplinary action' against the
lawyer.").
2 See STEPHEN B. BURBANK, RULE 11 IN TRANSITION: THE REPORT OF THE
THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 36-37 (1989).
12 See id. at 37; FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2).
123 See NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 73, § 3.42, at 537.
12 Among the changes was the transition from mandatory to discretionary
sanctions, which led to courts choosing to forego sanctions even if Rule 11 was
clearly violated. See Barbara Comninos Kruzansky, Note, Sanctions for Non-
Frivolous Complaints? Sussman v. Bank of Israel and Implications for the Improper
Purpose Prong of Rule 11, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1359, 1369 (1998). In the PSLRA,
Congress enacted a provision that essentially restored Rule 11 to its 1983 form in
private securities class actions. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(c)(1) (2006); see also Corroon v.
Reeve, 258 F.3d 86, 92-93 (2d Cir. 2001); Simon DeBartolo Group, L.P. v. Richard E.
Jacobs Group, Inc., 186 F.3d 157, 167 (2d Cir. 1997).
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inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it
may be maintained as a class action. 1 25  Several federal courts
have recently reinterpreted the Eisen decision and examined the
prerequisites more carefully regardless of whether that inquiry
involved a review of the merits. 12  In Miles v. Merrill Lynch &
Co. (In re Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation),127 the
court overturned the class certification stating that the judge did
not sufficiently probe into the plaintiffs' claims to ensure that the
requirements of Rule 23 were met.128 The court ruled that a
district court judge may certify a class only after making
determinations that each of the Rule 23 requirements was met
and that "such determinations can be made only if the judge
resolves factual disputes relevant to each Rule 23 requirement
and finds that whatever underlying facts are relevant to a
particular Rule 23 requirement have been established. ' 129  The
recent decision in In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litigation3 '
brings the Third Circuit in line with other circuits requiring a
rigorous analysis for class certification. In this case, the court
rejected a "threshold showing" standard, holding that any factual
determination must be made by a preponderance of the evidence.
It was held that the court must resolve all disputes relevant to
class certification, even if they overlap with the merits-
including disputes touching on elements of the cause of action. 3'
2' Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974). Several articles have
criticized the Eisen ruling. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class
Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51 DuKE L.J. 1251, 1254, 1329-30 (2002)
(arguing that the Eisen rule provides fertile ground for frivolous claims and
unwarranted settlements that create substantial costs); Geoffrey P. Miller, Review of
the Merits in Class Action Certification, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 51, 52-55 (2004)
(advocating a refined merits-inquiry approach on the grounds of both fairness and
economic efficiency).
2' See Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 268
(5th Cir. 2007); Miles v. Merrill Lynch & Co. (In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig.),
471 F.3d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 2006).
127 471 F.3d 24.
128 Id. at 29-30.
... Id. at 41. This test has replaced the more relaxed "some showing" standard
previously used as to Rule 23's prerequisites. Coffee & Paulovic, supra note 101, at
S-790.
1 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2009).
1 Id. at 307.
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D. The PSLRA
The 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act altered
both substantive and procedural practice in class actions brought
under the federal securities laws. It was "designed to prevent
abuses of federal securities class action lawsuits ' 132 and to
"transfer primary control of private securities litigation from
lawyers to investors. 133 The PSLRA subjected private securities
plaintiffs to pleading requirements and created penalties for
frivolous lawsuits that were much more demanding "than those
applicable to other litigants in federal court. '134 By stiffening the
rules surrounding the certification of federal securities class
actions, the PSLRA presented another device that attempts to
ensure that only worthwhile lawsuits make it past the
certification stage.
Before the enactment of the PSLRA, some argued that there
was a problem of abundant securities litigation without merit,135
and that many securities fraud lawsuits were often filed shortly
after a steep fall in stock price, even if there was no evidence of
misrepresentation. 36  It was also argued that many of these
lawsuits were brought for the purpose of extracting settlements,
112 Richard H. Walker & J. Gordon Seymour, Recent Judicial and Legislative
Developments Affecting the Private Securities Fraud Class Action, 40 ARIZ. L. REV.
1003, 1023 (1998); see also David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and
Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 939 n.68 (1998) (asserting that some provisions
of the PSLRA were "evidently designed to help curb perceived abuses in such
litigation ... by trying to assure proper monitoring of plaintiffs' counsel by a
shareholder with the interest and capacity to keep a close watch on the case").
' S. REP. No. 104-98, at 6 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 685.
" Charles M. Yablon, Essay, A Dangerous Supplement? Longshot Claims and
Private Securities Litigation, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 567, 569 (2000).
1:15 The prevalence of meritless securities class actions was not unanimously
agreed upon. See, e.g., Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the
Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class
Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2080-88 (1995) ("[S]ome portion of class actions surely
meet our definition of strike suits."). But see Joel Seligman, Commentary, The Merits
Do Matter: A Comment on Professor Grundfest's "Disimplying Private Rights of
Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission's Authority," 108 HARV.
L. REV. 438, 445-49 (1994) (asserting that dismissal rates show that courts "are
capable of dismissing and sanctioning nonmeritorious federal securities class
actions").
"' Under the current system, lawyers often bring lawsuits immediately after a
drop in a company's stock price, without any further research into the real cause of
the price decline. As a result the suits often have no substantive merit, but they
have the effect of presenting the company with the unhappy choice between a costly,
lengthy discovery process and an exorbitant, unjustified settlement. 141 CONG. REC.
E2437-03 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (speech of Rep. Schumer).
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and that plaintiffs would usually settle for a fixed percentage of
the claimed damages regardless of the actual strength of
the underlying claims.137 As Geoffrey Miller notes, existing
procedures for preventing frivolous lawsuits had not worked:
"Although in theory plaintiffs were required to plead fraud with
specificity,... courts had not enforced the requirement of specific
pleading with sufficient vigor. ' 138 In response to these and other
concerns, the PSLRA reformed both the substance and procedure
of securities class actions.
Among other reforms created by the PSLRA, each plaintiff
seeking to serve as the named plaintiff must submit a sworn
statement confirming that he or she has reviewed the complaint
and authorized its filing,139 that he or she did not purchase the
security at the direction of plaintiffs counsel or in order to
commence the litigation, and that he or she is willing to serve as
a representative and provide testimony in court. The plaintiff
has to disclose the transactions in the security that are the
subject of the complaint and identify any other lawsuits during
the preceding three years in which he or she has sought to serve
as a representative plaintiff in a securities class action. The
plaintiff must also state that he or she will not accept any
payment for serving as a representative party beyond the pro
rata share of any recovery, except for reasonable costs and
expenses directly relating to the representation of the class. 140
Pertaining to the selection of the named plaintiff, the court is
instructed to "appoint as lead plaintiff the member or members of
the purported plaintiff class that the court determines to be most
capable of adequately representing the interests of class
members." '141 The PSLRA establishes a rebuttable presumption
"' Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in
Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 500, 523 (1991) (concluding that
probably the "merits did not affect the settlement amounts" and that most securities
class action claims settle at a rate of around twenty-five percent of potential
damages).
190 Miller, supra note 42, at 592-93.
139 Securities Act of 1933 § 27(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(2)(A) (2006); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D (c), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(2)(A) (2006).
140 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(a)(2), 78u-4(a)(2). This is not the case in non-securities
class actions. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miler, Incentive Awards to
Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1303 (2006) (arguing
that the PSLRA's limitation on incentive awards to class representatives may have
been unwise).
141 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(i), 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i).
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that the class member who comes forward with the greatest
financial stake in the litigation is the "most adequate plaintiff' to
represent the class. 142 The underlying assumption is that a class
member with a large financial stake will effectively monitor the
conduct of class counsel.143
The PSLRA sets forth rules governing "sanctions for abusive
litigation." '144 The court must make specific findings regarding
compliance with Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure as to any securities fraud case. Even though the court
is required to impose sanctions if a party or attorney violated
Rule 11(b), these sanctions are seldom used.145
Recent empirical research suggests that the success of the
PSLRA thus far has been limited. Cox and Thomas assert that
"post-PSLRA settlements are not statistically different from
those in the pre-PSLRA period," '146 and, therefore, "suggest that
the enactment of the PSLRA had no significant impact on
settlement size." '147 Moreover, they find that "[investors appear
to be recovering a smaller percentage of their losses today than
they did before the passage of the PSLRA.
1 48
Proponents of the PSLRA argue that there are indications
that it is, in fact, serving its purpose of purging the federal
system of unfounded class action claims. 9 It seems, however,
that the PSLRA eliminates meritorious cases as well as frivolous
ones.1 50  However, this tradeoff is one of dubious merit.
141 Id. §§ 77z-l(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I), 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I).
141 James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical
Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587,
1588 (2006).
144 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(c), 78u-4(c).
145 Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its
Lawyers: Changes During the First Decade After the PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
1489, 1508 (2006) ("Despite the recurring use of adjectives like 'mandatory,' 'specific,'
and 'each' in the sanction provision and the hundreds of class actions brought since
the Act was enacted, we find that the sanction provision has been little used as a
weapon against possibly abusive class actions.").
116 Cox & Thomas, supra note 143, at 1628-29.
147 Id. at 1629; see also Casey, supra note 27, at 1254.
... Cox & Thomas, supra note 143, at 1637.
143 See Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Re/brm Act
Work?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 913. 976 ("[T]here is statistically significant evidence
suggesting that the PSLRA improved overall case quality at least in the circuit that
most strictly interprets the ... heightened pleading standard.").
"' See Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act?, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 598, 623 (2007) (arguing that the
PSLRA reduces meritorious litigation and works less like a selective deterrent
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Moreover, since the PSLRA deals only with securities class
actions, it cannot reduce class action abuse in other areas of the
law.
E. Heightened Pleading Standards and Motions To Dismiss
A recent United States Supreme Court decision has
dramatically changed the pleading standards in civil litigation."'
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,"' the Supreme Court
repudiated the well-established decision in Conley v. Gibson,'53
according to which "a complaint should not be dismissed for
failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief." '54 In Twombly, the Court required
greater factual specificity than had been required under Rule
8(a)(2)-"a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief"5 5-and in the Official Forms to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court did so for the
purpose of requiring trial courts, in ruling on motions to dismiss,
to consider whether the lawsuit states a "plausible" claim,
interpreted in Twombly to be one in which "the inference of
illegality [is] stronger than competing inferences."'56 As a result
of the Twombly decision, it is much harder for plaintiffs to
successfully defend a motion to dismiss.15 Since the Twombly
involved an antitrust class action case, it can be viewed as an
against fraud and more as a tax on all litigation); Choi, supra note 14, at 1472
("While the PSLRA may very well reduce the impact of frivolous litigation, however,
the Act may also work to chill meritorious litigation.").
'.. From the date of its decision until October 16, 2009, Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), had been cited in more than eighteen-thousand
federal decisions. LexisNexis search (on file with author). For an empirical analysis
of district court cases citing Twombly in the context of FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)
motions to dismiss, see Kendall W. Hannon, Much Ado About Twombly? A Study on
the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1811 (2008).
152 550 U.S. 544.
158 355 U.S. 41 (1957), abrogated by Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
114 Id. at 45-46; see also Linda S. Mullenix, Troubling "Twombly," NAT'L L.J.,
June 11, 2007, at 13 (contending that Twombly marks "a surprising departure from
ingrained federal pleading rules").
"Is FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
16. Editorial, The Devil in the Details, 91 JUDICATURE 52, 54 (2007).
"' See Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions To Dismiss
Become (Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 61 (2007)
(arguing that, in a small set of cases, motions on the pleadings can properly function
as truncated and disguised motions for summary judgment).
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effort to prevent attorneys from filing non-meritorious class
actions. Courts of appeals have been grappling with Twombly's
meaning and scope of application. Their struggles have resulted
in various approaches.1 5 ' However, in a recent Supreme Court
decision, the Court clarified that Twombly's "plausibility"
standard is now the pleading standard for all civil actions, not a
standard reserved for certain claims.
159
In Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 6 ° the
Supreme Court held that to survive a motion to dismiss under
the PSLRA, a complaint alleging a violation of Section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and Securities
and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5, must plead facts giving
rise to an inference of scienter1" that is "more than merely
plausible or reasonable-it must be cogent and at least as
compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent.
162
As others have observed, the Tellabs decision demonstrates that
the "pressures of the PSLRA's pleading rules have deformed the
Rule 12(b)(6) motion" to dismiss and converted it into "a sort of
hybrid between the motion to dismiss and the motion for
summary judgment."163 Even though the Court in Tellabs chose
a rather liberal interpretation of the language of PSLRA,
together with Congress's intended tightening of pleading, it may
still reduce the number of class action filings. 164 In this sense,
1 See, e.g., Anderson v. Sara Lee Corp., 508 F.3d 181, 188 n.7 (4th Cir. 2007);
Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157 n.7 (2d Cir. 2007), rev'd sub nom. Ashcroft v. Jqbal,
129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
1' Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (U.S. 2009).
160 551 U.S. 308 (2007).
161 "Scienter" refers to a state of mind embracing intent to deceive, manipulate,
or defraud. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.1 2 (1976); BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (8th ed. 2004).
162 Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 314.
163 Geoffrey P. Miller, Pleading After Tellabs, 2009 Wis. L. RFV. 507, 532. Miller
also suggests that the conversion of the motion to dismiss into a quasi-motion for
summary judgment gives the "trial judge a degree of discretion to reject cases
deemed unsuitable for litigation," also outside of the boundaries of securities fraud
cases. Id. at 534.
.64 While this article argues that the Tellabs decision suggests greater
willingness to dismiss at the pleading stage, one can validly argue that this decision
was more lenient than Twombly's, and that the Supreme Court in Tellabs could have
interpreted the language of the PSLRA even more stringently and imposed a stricter
pleading standard, as was advocated by Justices Scalia and Alito. Tellabs, 551 U.S.
at 329 (Scalia, J., concurring) (rejecting the Court's "at least as compelling" test and
stating "the test should be whether the inference of scienter (if any) is more plausible
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the Twombly, Tellabs, and Iqbal decisions suggest a greater
willingness to dismiss cases at the pleading stage. They deter
frivolous litigation by requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate at
the outset that the lawsuit is likely to be meritorious and not a
mere device for extracting unjustified settlements. 165 However,
the new restrictive pleading standard may not only reduce the
number of frivolous lawsuits, but may also frustrate meritorious
litigation and result in less illegal conduct being redressed.
16 6
The new pleading standard may "deny court access to those
who ... have meritorious" class actions but cannot satisfy the
new pleading requirements for reasons such as "informational
asymmetries" or because they lack the resources to engage in
investigation before they submit the claim.6 7
F. The Class Action Fairness Act
The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 can be viewed as
another instrument intended to limit class action abuses. One of
the declared purposes of CAFA was to protect absent class
members from the collusive behavior of class counsel.168 CAFA
was enacted on the premise that collusion presents a serious
problem that occurs mostly in state courts, and hence the Act
offers widened access to federal court as its principal solution.
1 9
Proponents of CAFA hoped it would eliminate perceived abuses
in some states that permitted plaintiffs to commence national
class actions and in which the courts and procedures were overly
than the inference of innocence"); id. at 333-34 (Alito, J., concurring) (agreeing with
Justice Scalia's interpretation).
165 See id. at 322 (majority opinion).
166 See Epstein, supra note 157, at 98.
117 See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of "General Rules,"
2009 WIS. L. REV. 535, 561.
161 See supra note 86.
"' Nevertheless, CAFA's provisions addressing class action abuses are
applicable only in federal courts-where arguably they were not needed by 2005-
and not in state courts, "in some of which they might still be useful." Stephen B.
Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A Preliminary
View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1448 (2008).
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plaintiff friendly. 1711 Moreover, the Act specifically mentions the
misalignments between the interests of class members and those
of class counsel as one of the evils that it purports to address.171
To curb these so-called abuses, CAFA includes regulatory
provisions, one of which was meant to increase judicial scrutiny
applicable to settlement agreements that provide coupons
to purchase products or services at a discount from the
malfeasant. 172 When determining attorney fees, CAFA requires a
court to evaluate the real monetary value and the likely
utilization rate of the settlement coupons. 173 CAFA also vastly
expands federal subject matter jurisdiction for class actions 174
and amends the removal laws to provide federal jurisdiction, at
the choosing of the defendant, 171 over class actions that do not
satisfy the traditional "complete diversity" and "amount in
controversy" requirements. 
176
According to recent empirical studies, in the post-CAFA
period, class action litigation has increased substantially in
federal courts as the number of monthly filings and removals of
class actions increased from about 200 per month in the end of
171 See, e.g., NLJ Roundtable: Class Action Fairness Act, NAT'L L.J., May 16,
2005 at 18 (reproducing the remarks of Professor Issacharoff, who noted that, "[i]f
you're a defendant, you want to stay away from any county named after a president
that's by a body of water"); Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 64, at 1655-56
("[T]he core justification for CAFA stems from the problem of the anomalous court,"
which may "be inclined to certify a nationwide class action when ... other
courts ... would be disinclined to certify.").
171 See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(a)(3), 119 Stat.
4-5 ("Class members often receive little or no benefit from class actions, and are
sometimes harmed, such as where-(A) counsel are awarded large fees, while
leaving class members with coupons or other awards of little or no value.").
172 28 U.S.C. § 1712 (2006); see, e.g., Coffee, supra note 36, at 1367-68
(discussing the use of coupons as a form of collusion between the class counsel and
the defendants).
173 28 U.S.C. § 1712(a). CAFA also ties coupon settlements to attorney fees, and
specifies that attorney fee awards be based on value to class members of coupons
actually redeemed. Id. According to another important provision, the court may
approve a settlement in which class members incur losses to compensate class
counsel "only if the court makes a written finding that nonmonetary benefits to the
class member substantially outweigh the monetary loss." Id. § 1713.
171 See id. § 1332(d).
175 See id. §§ 1441(a), 1453.
176 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1441, 1446, 1453. For a comprehensive description
of CAFA's jurisdictional provisions compared with the default regime, see Burbank,
supra note 169, at 1453-59.
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2001 to more than 300 per month in 2005-2006.77 According to
this research, at least one initial purpose of the Act is fulfilled.
Commentators disagree as to the extent of success in fulfilling
other stated goals. Some believe that many of the abusive
practices have been curbed. 178 Others assert that since "the Act
offers no mechanism by which absent class plaintiffs can act
independently of class counsel to [re]move their lawsuits [in]to
federal court," the Act fails to solve the problem of misalignment
between the interests of class counsel and those of absent
members of the class and the problem of sweetheart class
settlements. 179 Put differently, the Act still allows for the parties
to shop a settlement to state courts. If class counsel is as
unreliable as the Act assumes, he or she clearly cannot be trusted
to file lawsuits, especially in settlement-only class actions
where federal courts promise to inspect his or her actions
more stringently. 180 Therefore, it does not seem reasonable that
CAFA solved any of the aforementioned problems. It may have
even exacerbated the situation, since CAFA grants the right
to remove to federal court at any time,"5 ' which facilitates a
possible extortion: The defendants can remain in state court and
threaten class counsel with removal unless class counsel agrees
to settle the class members' rights for less than they are worth.182
In other words, it is quite possible that the Act only "achieved" a
role reversal- extorted class counsel instead of blackmailed
defendants. . Therefore, from the standpoint of class members,
17 Lee & Willging, supra note 118, at 1750. According to other research, CAFA
increased the number of diversity class actions from twenty-seven cases per month
to approximately fifty-three. See WILLGING & LEE, supra note 71.
171 Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 64, at 1722.
17' Tobias Barrington Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction and Due Process in the Era of
the Nationwide Class Action, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2035, 2039 (2008); see also Purcell,
supra note 100, at 1873-74.
"' See Wolff, supra note 179, at 2041-42; see also, e.g., In re Gen. Motors Corp.
Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 805 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting
that courts should "be even more scrupulous than usual in approving settlements
where no class has yet been formally certified"); Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont'l Ill. Nat'l
Bank & Trust, 834 F.2d 677, 681 (7th Cir. 1987) ("[Wlhen class certification is
deferred, a more careful scrutiny of the fairness of the settlement is required.");
Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 73 (2d Cir. 1982) ("[D]istrict judges [reviewing
settlement-only class actions] are bound to scrutinize the fairness of the settlement
agreement with even more than the usual care.").
"' 28 U.S.C. § 1453 ("A class action may be removed to a district court of the
United States in accordance with section 1446 (except that the 1-year limitation
under section 1446(b) shall not apply).").
112 Purcell, supra note 100, at 1874.
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the enactment of CAFA amplified the dangers of class actions.
CAFA cannot protect absent class members from the collusive
behavior of class counsel.
Moreover, when combined with the current inclination of
federal courts to apply stricter standards in certifying class
actions, CAFA also impedes class action practice. As noted
above, current research suggests that fewer class actions are
being certified in federal courts. 1 3  Therefore, CAFA has been
justly blamed for narrowing corporate tort liability and curbing
the use of class actions.184 Clearly, CAFA affects class action
litigation far beyond the question of venue.
By making certification less likely, CAFA weakened class
actions' positive externalities discussed previously in this
Article.i8 5 In raising the frequency of non-certification, CAFA has
impaired class actions' deterrence effect. This is particularly
alarming given the American legal system's heavy dependence on
litigation as ex post regulation.'86 In the same vein, CAFA's
removal provisions give rise to more bureaucratization of the
federal court system, which presents a problem in a legal system
which relies on litigation as an ex post regulator and harms the
goals that underlie the class action mechanism.
This Part has examined some of the mechanisms used to
curb perceived class action abuses. Various mechanisms have
been employed to curb perceived class action abuses, but as has
been noted, doubts exist as to whether they have been successful
in doing so. Moreover, while some of the mechanisms may help
reduce class action abuse, at the same time they eliminate
meritorious cases and foil the purposes underpinning the class
action procedure. The fact that courts of appeals in different
circuits have recently imposed more rigorous certification
standards may be the best evidence that prominent members of
the judiciary believe current mechanisms do not suffice and that
more should to be done to curb class action abuses.
18 See supra notes 99-101.
184 Id. at 1926.
1 See supra text accompanying notes 31-35.
186 ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 13
(Harv. Univ. Press, 2001); Burbank, supra note 167.
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IV. CURRENT USE OF GOOD FAITH IN AMERICAN AND ISRAELI
CLASS ACTIONS
This Part begins with an overview of the important role of
good faith as a certification prerequisite in Israeli class action
proceedings. The sporadic uses of good faith in federal class
action proceedings are then introduced. Even though good faith
is not mentioned in Rule 23 as a prerequisite to class action
certification, it is not completely absent from the class action
landscape. This overview serves as a reference point for later a
discussion which argues that a more robust and explicit
employment of good faith in federal class actions would be
beneficial in curbing class action abuse.
A. Good Faith Prerequisite in Israeli Class Actions
1. Historical Background of the Class Action in Israel
Before addressing the good faith concept in Israeli class
actions, it is necessary to briefly describe class action proceedings
in Israel. Class actions are not a new phenomenon in Israel,
recognized in subsidiary legislation many years ago. 187 However,
it is only in the last two decades-with the enactment of subject-
matter-specific laws under which class actions could be
instituted188-that a significant increase in class action filings
has occurred. However, despite the increase in filing, at the end
of the day, only a small number of these claims were certified.18 9
The first statutory source for class actions in Israel was Rule
29 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.19 ° Until 1988 this rule was the
only legal vehicle permitting class actions in Israel. However, a
Israeli Supreme Court ruling in 1969 prohibited Rule 29 from
being employed to commence a class action in its modern sense.' 9'
1.7 For a discussion of these developments, see Taussig, supra note 7, at 3:2-:5.
L See Taussig, supra note 7 at 3:3.
181 In the years 1995-2000 less than 30 lawsuits were certified in Israel. Sinai
Deutsch, Consumer Class Action-Difficulties and proposals for Solution, 20(2)
MECHKAREY MISHPAT 299, 310 (2004). See also Stephen Goldstein & Yael Ephron,
The Development of Class Actions in Israel, 1 ALEI MISHPAT 27, 32-33 (1999).
19" The Rules of Civil Procedure, 1984, S.T. 4685, 2220. The same Rule appeared
in the previous version of the Rules of Civil Procedure, 1974, S.T. 3163, 1618. A
somewhat different version appeared in the Rules of Civil Procedure, 1963, S.T.
1477, 1872.
191 CA 86,79/69 Frankisha Markeka & Co. v. Rabinovitch [1969] IsrSC 23(1) 645.
This ruling prohibited Rule 29 from being employed to recover damages in actions
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In the absence of trans-substantive law, subject-matter-
specific class action provisions have been adopted piecemeal in
various legislative enactments over the years. These enactments
drew heavily on Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The result was two-fold: (1) there were conflicting provisions due
to the variety of legislative enactments involved; and (2) in
important areas of activity that were not covered by any of these
enactments, there was still no provision for class action
proceedings. The 2006 comprehensive Israeli Class Actions Law
("ICAL") 9 2 was triggered by Israel v. E.S.T. Management &
Manpower Ltd., in which the Israeli Supreme Court urged the
Israeli Parliament to promulgate a new law to remedy the
unacceptable state of class action proceedings. 9" The new law
replaced all of the subject-matter-specific provisions and
significantly broadened the scope of potential class actions.
All class action legislation (except for Rule 29) included
certification procedures similar to those adopted in the United
States. The ICAL incorporates a certification procedure in
section 8, whereby a court may certify a claim as a class action
only if it is convinced that all of the following prerequisites have
been met:
8(a)(1): The suit raises material questions of fact or law
common to the class, and there is a reasonable possibility that
the decision regarding those will be in favor of the class;
1 94
8(a)(2): A class action is the efficient and appropriate means of
resolving the dispute in the circumstances of the case;' "
based on tort claims held severally by individual class members. Rather, it was only
applicable to actions for injunctions or declaratory relief.
C92 lass Actions Law, 2006, S.H. 2054, at 264.
Leave to CA 3126/00 Israel v. E.S.T. Mgmt. & Manpower Ltd. [20031 IsrSC
57(3) 220, 277-78.
194 This sub-section calls for two notes. First, this requirement is more relaxed
than the requirement in the preceding laws, in which the legislature required that
the suit raise common questions of law and fact, as a condition to certification.
Second, even though the second condition of this prerequisite (pertaining to chances
of success of the claim) was only incorporated in some of the laws preceding the
ICAL, Israeli Courts have held that they would nevertheless apply it even if absent
from the relevant law. See, e.g., CA 6567/97 Bezeq - Israel Telecomm. Corp, Ltd. v.
Estate of Gat [1998] IsrSC 52(2) 713, 719-20.
"' This requirement will be satisfied where the size of the putative class is so
large as to make joinder impractical, where the management of separate suits would
be a waste of judicial resources, or where separate claims may yield contradictory
decisions. See, e.g., Alon Kiement, Guidelines for Interpretation of the 2006 Class
Actions Law, 49 HAPRAKLIT 131, 145-46 (2007).
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8(a)(3): There exists a reasonable basis to assume that the
interests of all the members of the class will be properly
represented and managed; the defendant may not appeal or
request to appeal a decision in this matter;
8(a)(4): There exists a reasonable basis to assume that the
interests of all the members of the class will be represented and
managed in good faith.19
In effect, therefore, the ICAL established a two-stage process
for the management of class actions: an initial gate-keeping stage
in which the court is required to determine whether a class
action is appropriate, and a second stage in which, if certified as
a class action, the claim is managed, settled, or decided in
accordance with the specialized procedures provided by the law.
According to an Israeli Supreme Court decision, the plaintiff has
to show that his or her claim discloses a prima facie cause of
action and fulfills all other prerequisites of a class action before
being certified. 197 The court held that the purpose of imposing a
higher standard of proof than in a preliminary motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim is that the class action procedure is
different from regular litigation in terms of, among other things,
the extensive ramifications for the represented class, the
defendant, and the public as a whole.198
2. Good Faith Under the ICAL
Section 8(a) of the ICAL-similar to Rule 23(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure-contains two types of prerequisites:
(1) those relating to the claim itself and whether it may
effectively be managed as a class action; and (2) those relating to
the plaintiff and class counsel.1 99 If any condition in the first
category is not fulfilled, the claim should not be adjudicated as a
1' In addition to these prerequisites, the plaintiff must state a cause of action
mentioned in the Second Addition to the Law and must have standing according to
sections 3(a) and 4(a) of the ICAL.
197 This rule was cited both before and after the legislation of the ICAL. See, e.g.,
Leave to CA 4474/97 Tetzet v. Zilbershatz [2000] IsrSC 54(2) 577; E.S.T., IsrSC 57(3)
220; Labor Appeal 1154/04 Gross v. Israel - Defense Ministry [2007] (not published).
19' CA 2967/95 Magen and Keshet v. Tempo [1997] IsrSC 51(2) 312. The extent
to which the burden of proof is higher remains vague, but the court ruled that the
plaintiff has to convince the court, according to the appropriate likelihood measure,
and not merely according to the facts argued in the pleading, that he or she prima
facie fulfils the above-mentioned prerequisites.
199 See Taussig, supra note 7 (comparing Rule 23 certification prerequisites and
those of Section 8(a) of the Israeli Class Actions Law).
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class action. If any condition in the second category is not
satisfied, then the court has discretion to either replace or add to
the named plaintiff or class counsel to those who initially brought
the claim.200
Israeli courts use the good faith requirement to scrutinize
the motives of the representative plaintiff who files a class
action. 2°1 The main reason is to prevent frivolous claims, which
can impose severe hardships on defendants.0 2 Israeli courts do
not certify class actions that have been instituted for collateral or
illegitimate purposes, such as extortion, harming a competitor, or
facilitating a hostile takeover. Another goal is to prevent the
lawsuit from damaging the rest of the class members, inter alia,
due to collusion between the class action plaintiff and the
defendants. The good faith prerequisite was integrated into class
action proceedings to prevent such abuses.20 3
It is still unclear just how the good faith prerequisite will be
affected by the enactment of the ICAL. According to the
language of the new law, the Israeli legislature has broadened
the good faith requirement, as this prerequisite no longer relates
only to the filing stage of the proceedings, but also to case
management and class representation. 20 4  The ICAL creates
200 ICAL, § 8(c). The rationale for limiting the remedy to replacement is clear:
The Israeli Legislature tried to discourage defendants from unduly objecting to the
propriety of the named plaintiff or class counsel.
20 See, e.g., Stephen Goldstein & Yael Ephron, The Mechanisms of Class Action
and Derivative Action in the New Corporation Law, 32(2) MISHPATIM 462, 476
(2002).
202 GIL LOTIAN & EYAL RAZ, CLASS ACTIONS 129 (1996); Leave to another
Appeal 5712/01 Barazani v. Bezeq-Israeli Comm. Corp. et al. [2003] Dinim-SC 64,
943; CC (TA) 1252/92 Analyst A.M.C. Management of Trust Funds (1986) Ltd. v.
Israel [1993] Takdin-DC 94(2) 210.
2011 See, e.g., CC (TA) 1252/93 Analyst A.M.C. Management of Trust Funds (1986)
Ltd. v. Israel [1993] Takdin-DC 94(2) 210, 217; Zohar Goshen, A Critical View on the
New Companies Law: The Purpose of the Corporation, Purchase Propoals and the
Class Action, 32(2) MISHPATIM 381, 414 (2002).
204 The good faith prerequisite, in various wording, was part of most of the prior
subject-matter-specific legislation. See, e.g., § 210(b) of the Companies Law, 1999,
S.H. 1711, at 189 ("[T]he court will not certify the class action suit if it finds that the
suit was lodged without good faith."); § 35 of the Consumer Protection Law, 1981,
S.H. 1474, at 252 (1994) ("[T]he filing of a class action suit requires the certification
of the court and he will not certify it unless he is persuaded that the following
prerequisites are fulfilled .... The claim was lodged in good faith."). Since the good
faith prerequisite in the prior laws addressed only the stage of certification, Israeli
case law that preceded the ICAL usually addressed this stage alone, and did not
address more advanced stages of class action proceedings. In one case it was ruled,
though, that the good faith prerequisite should be maintained throughout the
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another significant permutation: The new law applies the good
faith doctrine-and the proper representation doctrine-to class
counsel as well as to the named plaintiff."5 Thus, courts are now
able to scrutinize the behavior of class counsel both before and
after the filing of class action lawsuits. Another change under
the new law is that the burden of proof on the issue of good faith
is imposed on the defendant, who must show that the named
plaintiff acted in bad faith when the class action was filed.2"'
Otherwise, it would seem that the ICAL does not meaningfully
change the role of good faith in Israeli class action proceedings.
Since the ICAL was enacted only fairly recently, there is
limited case law and learned commentary available in Israel
pertaining to the content of the good faith prerequisite. That
said, the good faith requirement occupied the Israeli courts a
great deal before the enactment of the ICAL.
3. Good Faith in Class Actions Before Enactment of the ICAL
Israeli courts and legal scholars who have dealt with the
good faith prerequisite in the context of class actions have given
it various interpretations. Next, the meaning of good faith in
Israeli class actions is fleshed out through Israeli case law.
Later, a review of Israeli legal literature provides a predictive
guidance on the roles that good faith will play under the new
Law.
a. The Good Faith Requirement in Israeli Case Law
The meaning of the good faith requirement has long
preoccupied the attention of Israeli courts. This Part of the
article introduces the main judicial interpretations.
proceedings, not only when the suit is lodged. See CC (TA) 3006/00 Danush v.
Chrysler Corp. [2003] Dinim-DC 34(1) 730, affld, CA 1509/04 Danush v. Chrysler
Corp. [2007] Takdin-SC 2007(4) 2298.
2( Section 17 of the ICAL expressly states that the class counsel must "act with
loyalty and dedication to benefit the group in whose name the request for
certification was submitted." ICAL, § 17.
211 See, e.g., CC (TA) 2122/04 Katvan v. Otsar Mifaley Yam Ltd. [2007] Takdin-
DC 2007(3) 11984, 11993. Most Israeli case law and scholars did not refer to the
distinction between the burden of persuasion and the burden of production of
evidence concerning good faith. However, it seems like the intention of the courts
was to shift the burden of production of evidence alone, while the burden of
persuasion remained as always on the shoulders of the plaintiff. In other words, the
plaintiff is not required to bring evidence in order to prove his good faith unless the
defendant indicates facts that place his good faith in doubt.
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Under the Israeli good faith prerequisite, most courts
examine the motives of plaintiffs who file class action lawsuits.
In Analyst v. Israel, °7 Judge Strusman interpreted the good faith
prerequisite as being a tool to prevent frivolous claims where the
main aim is to threaten defendants and to exert pressure on
them so that they settle despite the fact that they are not liable.
He held that the requirements that the court be persuaded that
the class action was commenced in good faith and had reasonably
good chances of success-requirements that do not exist in the
United States-were adopted to prevent class actions from being
used to threaten and intimidate defendants.0 8 In another case, a
court held that the good faith prerequisite is intended to place an
obstacle before those claimants who institute their claim for
improper motives.209 The court also mentioned a special instance
of a lack of good faith that was discussed before-sweetheart
settlements-a collusion between the applicant and
the respondent, intended to block the path of potential
claimants. 210  In the case of Shemesh v. Reichart,
211
a similar test was upheld. The court held that the term "good
faith" in this context is a response to the universal norms
of equity and the honest aspiration for restitution and
compensation for funds invested in the capital markets with an
anticipation to make a profit that was lost because of the
217 CC (TA) 1252/93 Analyst A.M.C. Mgmt. of Trust Funds (1986) Ltd. v. Israel
[19941 Takdin-DC 94(2) 210, 217.
211 See also CC (Jer) 574/93, 1365/93 Weinblat v. Bernstein [1995] Takdin-DC
95(4) 193 (noting that when examining the good faith prerequisite, the court should
determine whether the class action is intended to exert pressure and extortion on
the defendant, while defendants must show that by instituting the claim, the
plaintiff is likely to obtain an unfair advantage, such as commercial competition or
the discovery of commercial secrets).
.09 CC (Jer) 15/94, 67/94 Gabril v. Alliance Tires Factory Ltd. [1995] (not
published). In another case the respondents claimed that, in effect, a competing
company lay behind the plaintiffs' actions. The court did not make any final ruling
on the question of whether all cases of involvement of a competing company would
disqualify a class action plaintiff due to the lack of good faith, but it did hold that
under the circumstances of the case the plaintiffs had indeed acted in bad faith. See
CC (TA) 1124/00, 2380/00 Zaltzman v. Tibon Veal Ltd. [2001] (not published).
21o Since the absent members of the class are bound by the settlement, a
collusive settlement between the class counsel and the defendants may prevent the
filing of new lawsuits by other members of the class. An appeal of this decision was
filed and granted, but the scope of the good faith prerequisite was not addressed. See
Leave to CA 1561/95 Gabril v. Alliance Tires Factory Ltd. [1996] Dinim-SC 43, 909.
211 CC (TA) 1134/95 Shemesh v. Reichart [1996] Dinim-DC 32(5) 841.
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defendants.21 The good faith test is intended to protect both the
members of the class and the defendants, and to block those
plaintiffs who are animated by motives that are contrary to the
aims of the procedure-that is, any aim besides compensation for
damages plus costs, which will be determined by the court for the
representative plaintiff.213  Those seeking to harm a
corporation-to influence its stock price, to force it to expose
business secrets, or to blackmail the company-are acting in bad
faith, just like the representative plaintiff who colludes with the
defendant in order to benefit himself at the expense of the class.
It was further held that instituting a class action for utilitarian
considerations does not violate the good faith prerequisite,
because the legislature set an economic incentive for instituting
class actions;2 14 that is, claims that are not brought for altruistic
considerations are also permitted.215
A different position was taken in the case of Zat v. Teva.216
Judge Levitt interpreted the good faith requirement in a broad
sense, linking it to other prerequisites. In his opinion, a judge
must make an objective inquiry as to whether the claim is
reasonable and fair, based on a genuine and serious cause of
action that might be beneficial to all members of the class and is
not intended to obtain aims of the plaintiff that do not fit in with
the interests of all the members of the class.217 This opinion was
rejected by other judges, who argued that the good faith test
should be subjective-the good faith of the party instituting the
212 Id.: See also CC (TA) 2477/99 Sabo v. Airport Auth. Isr. [2002] Dinim-DC
33(4) 843.
213 See Zohar Goshen, Good Faith in Lodging Class Action Suit, GLOBES, Oct. 12,
1994, at 5; Leave to CA 4556/94 Tetzet v. Zilbershatz [1996] IsrSC 49(5) 774, 787;
CC (Nz) 785/98 Zilbershlag v. El-Al Air Lines [19991 Takdin-DC 99(3) 1521, 1534.
214 Now anchored in ICAL, § 22.
2" These rulings were confirmed by the Supreme Court in the decision on the
leave to appeal (Shemesh, IsrSC 55(5) at 297-98), and other district courts have
reiterated them. See, e.g., CC (BS) 3273/97 Halevi v. Bezeq Int'l Ltd. [2001] Takdin-
DC 2001(2) 41129; CC (TA) 1372/95, 11141/95 Rabi v. Tnuva Collective Ctr. for
Mktg. Agric. Prod. Isr. (1996] (not published); CC (TA) 2036/01 Manela v. Mifal
Ha'Payis [2002] Dinim-DC 33(5). The district court also reiterated that notion after
the enactment of the ICAL. See Hershkowitz, Takdin-DC 2007(2) 11884.
21. CC (TA) 19/92 Zat-Co. for Econ. Counseling Ltd. v. Teva Med. Factories Ltd.
[1994] IsrDC 1994(1) 192.
"' That said, the mere fact that Levitt believes that only material omissions-
those that "go down to the root of the cause of action"-are relevant in evaluating
the plaintiffs good faith shows that he also believes that the good faith prerequisite's
scope should be limited. Judge Levitt's opinion was quoted with approval after the
enactment of the ICAL in Hershkowitz, Takdin-DC 2007(2) 11884.
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claim-while the objective element-the likelihood of the claim's
success-should be examined under the "chances of success"
prerequisite.218
These positions can be divided into two main categories. The
first and more common one views good faith as a tool meant to
prevent the certification of lawsuits commenced by claimants
who institute their claim for improper motives. This position
prescribes a solely subjective standard for the good faith
prerequisite. The second viewpoint views good faith as an
objective standard that addresses the reasonableness of the claim
and its chances to succeed.
b. Issues Related to Good Faith in Certification
Various related issues were dealt with under the good faith
prerequisite. In some cases, good faith was scrutinized in the
examination of whether the plaintiff had exhausted all other
options available before submitting the class action.219 In a
recent decision, the Israeli Supreme Court held that the fact that
the plaintiffs did not approach the defendant before he filed the
class action does not justify the conclusion that they acted in bad
faith. This is the case due to the underlying goals of the ICAL.220
The question of the "sophisticated investor" has also been
dealt with in the context of the good faith prerequisite. A
plaintiff who is a "sophisticated investor" is an investor who is
knowledgeable about securities and the ways of the stock
exchange. Some defendants have advanced the argument that
the sophisticated investor must expect the damages because he
or she is familiar with the ways of the market and having the
relevant information. Therefore, the personal cause of action
must be rejected and with it the whole class action. It has also
been argued that, when dealing with a sophisticated investor,
"' See, e.g., CC (TA) 1365/95 Levi v. La-Nat'l Ins. Corp. [1996] Dinim-DC 32(1)
489.
2fl See also CC (TA) 65/97 Isr. Consumers' Ass'n-Indep. Body v. Zeller Evalgon
Leasing Ltd. [1997] Dinim-DC 32(1) 530 (stating that the plaintiff did not comply
with the good faith prerequisite because he did not approach the defendant before he
filed the class action and because the necessary examination of the facts was not
done by the named plaintiff but by his agent, who did not file an affidavit and,
therefore, could not be cross-examined). But see CC (Jer) 486/97, 5047/97 Kibutz
Urim-Agric. Coop. Ltd. v. Israel [19991 (not published) (noting that a failure to first
make a demand on the defendant is not enough to form the basis of bad faith).
220 CA 10262/05 Aviv Sherutim Mishpati'im Ltd. v. Bank Hapoalim Ltd. [2008]
Takdin-SC 2008(4) 2450, 2454.
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there is a reason to suspect that the claim was submitted in order
to advance the plaintiffs personal affairs and not to obtain the
aims of the entire class. 221 At the same time, most district courts
have held that sophistication in itself does not negate the good
faith of a named plaintiff.212 In Tetzet v. Zilbershatz,2 3 the Israeli
Supreme Court ruled that a sophisticated investor complies with
the good faith requirement:
The first requirement is that the claim be lodged in good faith.
This condition does not exist if the class action was instituted
due to turpis causa, such as harming a competing company or
the desire to "extort" a compromise. It would appear to us that
the sophistication of the class action plaintiff does not in itself
harm his good faith. A class action plaintiff may sue in good
faith, regardless of whether he is a sophisticated investor or
not.224
Israeli case law has also dealt with the question of whether a
"serial plaintiff'-frequently named a "professional plaintiff'-
may serve as a representative plaintiff and whether his or her
status as such has any significance in the consideration of good
faith.225  A serial class plaintiff might purchase one share in
dozens of public companies, at a relatively cheap cost, and in so
doing, ensures that he or she will be considered an owner of a
security in the company whose actions or failures vest him or her
with a cause of action in a class action.226 Most Israeli district
courts used to prefer that a representative plaintiff not be a
serial plaintiff. An example of this can be seen in the case
of Global v. Hamisha Yod Jewellers,227 in which the court
distinguished between a sophisticated investor and a serial
plaintiff and held that the former can serve as a named class
221 See GIL LOTHAN & EYAL RAZ, CLASS ACTIONS 181-82 (1996).
222 See, e.g., Gabril v. Alliance Tires Factory Ltd. [1995] (not published).
23 Leave to CA 4556/94 Tetzet v. Zilbershatz [1996] IsrSC 49(5) 774.
224 Id. at 778. In the same case, President Barak quoted from Justice Douglas's
opinion in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver: "The Act does not speak in terms of
'sophisticated' as opposed to 'unsophisticated' people dealing in securities. The rules
when the giants play are the same as when the pygmies enter the market." Id.at
789. (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 526 (1974)).
221 In the United States, unlike in Israel, the phenomenon of the serial class
action plaintiff is quite common. See, e.g., DENISE M. MARTIN ET AL., RECENT
TRENDS IV: WHAT EXPLAINS FILINGS AND SETTLEMENTS IN SHAREHOLDER CLASS
ACTIONS? Table 12A (Nat'l Econ. Research Assocs. 1996).
... This is why, regarding securities class actions, the good faith of the plaintiff
should be examined as early as the stage of the acquisition of the share.
227 CC 1117/94 Global v. Hamisha Yod Jewellers [1995] Dinim-DC 26(7) 138.
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representative, but the latter cannot because there is a
"presumption that such a class action plaintiff does not institute
his claim in good faith."" 8 This position changed when the
Israeli Supreme Court held, in Tetzet, that the fact that a
plaintiff is a serial plaintiff does not automatically disqualify him
from conducting a class action, and each case must be examined
individually; only a serial class action plaintiff who conducts
many class actions with improper aims-such as extorting a
compromise or submitting frivolous claims-must be
disqualified.229 Similarly, in a case that was decided after the
enactment of the ICAL, a district court held that a history of
filing class actions may indicate a lack of good faith, but the mere
filing of class actions is not enough, and the court needs to
examine its terms, consequences, and circumstances before any
conclusion concerning the good faith of the plaintiff is drawn."'
A specific genre of serial plaintiff is a plaintiff who is "serial"
by virtue of being a lawyer or a plaintiff who is the spouse,
relative, or partner of the representing lawyer. A typical decision
was given in Goldstein v. Israeli Electricity Corp.,2" where it was
held that a class action instituted by a law firm or an attorney
working in that firm, serving both as the named plaintiff and as
the class counsel, is not necessarily tainted by bad faith. 32 On
228 Id. at para. 13.
229 Tetzet, IsrSC 49(5) at 789-90; see also CC (TA) 2402/02 Raizel v. Leumi Bank
Le-Israel Ltd. [2005] Dinim-DC 35(2) 902 (holding the fact that an applicant is a
serial plaintiff, in the sense that he has been conducting many claims by himself or
through relatives, does not necessarily need to stand against him, so long as he acts
in good faith); CC (TA) 2419/04 Acceleration Mgmt. & Inv. Co. v. United Mizrahi
Bank Ltd. [2006] Dinim-DC 36(5) 764. Yet, it seems that the "seriality" of a plaintiff
and his prior experience sets off "red flags" for some judges, who look more closely
into the issue of good faith of a class action plaintiff. In CC (TA) 2532/99, 57779/99
Consumer Hot Lines Ass'n v. Trans World Airlines Inc. [2000] (not published), the
court denied certification for a number of reasons, including the finding regarding
the serial nature of the plaintiff. The court reiterated the principle that the number
of class actions brought does not in itself negate the certification of the claim;
however, it did hold that a "red flag" had been raised regarding the good faith of the
plaintiff and that a much stricter examination was required in this matter. Id.
2. Hershkowitz, Takdin-DC 2007(2) 11884 at 9 10.
2. CC 937/95 Goldstein v. Israeli Elec. Corp. [19951 Dinim-DC 26(5) 356, 356.
..2 See, e.g., CC (BS) 2172/96 Estate of Eliahu Gat v. Bezeq-Isr. Telecomm.
Corp., Ltd. [19971 Takdin-DC 97(3) 960 (finding that the mere fact that the applicant
is a lawyer and the instituting of the class action may bring publicity which will
benefit him in his professional occupation, is not enough to negate his good faith);
CC (TA) 1279/96 Givon v. Shaare Zedek Med. Ctr. [1997] Dinim-DC 32(1) 711
(finding that the fact that the plaintiff is the counsel's mother should not disqualify
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the other hand, in the case of Zilbershlag v. El-Al,233 where a
class action was instituted on behalf of a lawyer and his wife, the
court indicated that difficulties might be created where a class
action is instituted by a lawyer. The court held that the fact that
a lawyer represents himself might cause him to be more
prepared to compromise, contrary to the interests of the class he
represents.234 Therefore, it was held that a lawyer instituting a
class action should not represent himself-although the court
was careful not to hold that this in itself was per se evidence of
bad faith. 5
c. The Future Roles of the Good Faith Requirement
Before the ICAL was enacted, there were differing views
among Israeli scholars regarding the content and scope of the
good faith requirement. Some scholars favored vigorous
application of the good faith requirement,236 while others
maintained that the requirement was superfluous. 237 The latter
argued that the good faith requirement may cause obfuscation
and difficulties in interpretation because of its overlap with some
threshold requirements. Those who favored a special level of
good faith, on a higher standard than that accepted in the
general Israeli law argued that the potential for injury to the
defendant and class members required the adoption of an
especially high standard of good faith. 8
Israeli legal literature has presented two main positions
regarding the interpretation that can be given to the principle of
good faith in class action proceedings. According to the first, the
the applicant); CC (TA) 3266/98 Kedem v. Bezeq-Isr. Telecomm. Corp., Ltd. [1999]
Dinim-DC 32(4) 479 (finding that the fact that the plaintiff was a lawyer and the
counsel was his partner does not undermine the good faith of the plaintiff who files a
worthy claim); Zeller Evalgon Leasing Ltd., Dinim-DC 32(1) 530.
232 CC (Nz) 749/97 Zilbershlag v. El-Al Air Lines [1998] Takdin-DC 98(2) 2851.
214 Id. at 2859.
235 Id.
216 See Goshen, supra note 203; Sinai Deutsch, Consumer Class Action-
Difficulties and Proposals for Solution, 20(2) MECHKAREY MISHPAT 299 (2004).
Goldstein and Ephron even suggested that the good faith prerequisite should be
used to file a lawsuit for breach of a statutory duty against a plaintiff who filed a
class action in bad faith. Goldstein & Ephron, supra note 201, at 475-76.
217 See LOTHAN & RAZ, supra note 202, at 134-35; JOSEPH GROSS, THE NEW
COMPANIES LAW 264-65 (3d ed. 2003); Noam Sher, Securities Law-Central Trends,
22(1) YIUNEY MISHPAT 265, 287 (1999).
211 See, e.g., Leave to CA 4556/94 Tetzet v. Zilbershatz [1996] JsrSC 49(5) 774,
774 (the position of the legal advisor to the government).
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representative plaintiff should be viewed as a "public emissary"
and must, therefore, act in good faith in the widest sense of this
term.239 According to the second interpretation, the good faith
requirement in bringing a class action is much more limited and
refers only to the aim of bringing the claim:
[A] claim in which the plaintiff intends to produce the full
benefits only by virtue of winning the claim, is a claim
instituted in good faith. On the other hand, a plaintiff seeking
to produce a benefit which is external to the claim itself-by the
mere instituting of the claim and not by hope of winning it-has
instituted his claim in bad faith.24°
This position has found support in the case law.24 On its
face, this position was not accepted by the Israeli legislature in
enacting the ICAL, insofar as far as it expanded the good faith
requirement to all stages of the process. Rather, the Israeli
legislature merely adopted the position expressed in the case law
according to which the good faith prerequisite should apply
from the start of the process until its end.242 Since the ICAL
was enacted fairly recently, the question of the appropriate
scope that should be given to good faith in class actions remains
open. Nevertheless, recent lower court rulings seem to be less
demanding than what we have come to know. It seems that
courts have internalized the aims of the new law to facilitate the
certification of class actions.243
... See Goshen, supra note 213.
240 Id.
241 See, e.g., CC (Nz) 785/98 Zilbershlag v. El-Al Air Lines [1999] Takdin-DC
99(3) 1521, 1534 (stating that in a consumer protection class actions the plaintiff
does not need to be like a "public emissary," and it is sufficient if he or she intends to
produce a beneficial outcome from the claim, honestly believes in the prospects of the
claim, and does not have ulterior motives). Thus, for example, if a corporation files a
claim against a competing corporation with the aim to damage its business and
disclose its professional secrets during the course of litigation, clearly this
corporation desires to benefit merely from the lodging of the claim and not from
winning it, thereby not complying with the requirement of good faith.
42 See, e.g., CC (TA) 3006/00 Danush v. Chrysler Corp. [2003] Dinim-DC 34(1)
730, affd, CA 1509/04 Danush v. Chrysler Corp. [2007] Takdin-SC 2007(4) 2298.
24' This is reflected in Section 1 of the new law:
The goal of this law is to set uniform rules in the matter of the submitting
and managing of class actions, in order to improve the defense of privileges,
and in doing so to particularly promote these: (1) Actualizing the privilege
of access to the court house, including the types of the population that find
it difficult addressing the court as individuals; (2) Enforcing the law and
deterring its breaking; (3) Giving proper assistance to those harmed by the
violation of the law; (4) Efficient, fair and exhaustive management of suits.
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Concerning the content of the good faith prerequisite, most
Israeli legal professionals argued before the enactment of the
ICAL that good faith in bringing a class action does not exist
where bringing the claim is vexatious and extortionist. Good
faith was identified with the motives of the named plaintiff.
Judge Levitt presented a different position in his article, which
as seen above, was reflected in his court decisions.244 His view-
that when the court considers whether a claim complies with the
good faith prerequisite it must determine, according to an
objective test, whether the claim sought is reasonable and fair,
and whether it might bring true utility to all members of the
class-will probably not be reiterated in the post-ICAL era. An
analytical review of Levitt's article clearly shows that his
interpretation of the good faith prerequisite has permeated the
other requirements which appear in the new law.245 Since the
new law includes all the requirements formerly embedded in
several of the preceding subject-matter-specific laws, an
interpretation that blurs the boundaries between the different
prerequisites is not likely.
As a whole, the differences in the wording of the ICAL and
previous legislation support the conclusion that Israeli courts will
broaden the good faith requirement both in terms of to whom it
will apply and when in the proceedings it will apply, but it will
retain the current narrow test. In other words, good faith's role
under the new legislation will change as follows: (1) good faith
will be used to monitor class counsel in addition to representative
plaintiffs; and (2) good faith will be used to scrutinize the
management and representation throughout the proceedings and
Class Actions Law, 2006, S.H. 2054, 264.
Indeed, recent data proves that the percentage of certified claims has increased since
the legislation of the ICAL. While in 2007 only 2.6% of claims were certified, in 2008
the number increased to 4.2% and in the first quarter of 2009 to 26%. Similarly,
more settlements are being approved: 3.5% in 2007, 10.2% in 2008, and 15.3% in the
first quarter of 2009. See Mark Sean, Recognition of Class Actions Is Getting
Strength: On the Way to America, CALCALIST, Apr. 6, 2009, at 28-29.
244 Ishai Levitt, Class Actions According to the Securities Law, 42(3) HAPRAKLIT
465 (1996).
24 This mainly relates to the requirement of a reasonable possibility that the
common material questions will be determined in favor of the class. See Class
Actions Law, 2006, S.H. 2054, § 8(a)(1). This requirement did not appear in some of
the preceding subject-matter-specific laws.
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not only upon the filing of the class action. On the other hand,
the courts will likely apply the narrow subjective test in giving
effect to the good faith requirement, consistent with its practice
before the enactment of the new law.
B. Good Faith Application in Federal Class Actions
Now, after exploring the use of good faith in Israeli class
actions, let us turn to the United States experience to assess
whether good faith can be of better use if explicitly integrated
into American class action proceedings.
"The recognition and expansion of a pervasive duty of good
faith has been possibly the single most significant doctrinal
development in American contract law over the past fifty
years." '246 The concept of good faith is widely entrenched in both
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and in the Uniform
Commercial Code.247 Moreover, it reaches beyond the boundaries
of contract law. In American corporate law, for instance, good
faith has been defined as requiring "an honest judgment seeking
to advance the corporation's interests. 248 In some cases, courts
... John A. Sebert, Jr., Legal Theory: Rejection, Revocation, and Cure Under
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Some Modest Proposals, 84 NW. U. L.
REV. 375, 383 (1990). A summary history of the good faith concept in American
legislation can be found in Robert S. Summers, The Conceptualisation of Good Faith
in American Contract Law: A General Account, in GOOD FAITH IN EUROPEAN
COMMON LAW 118-20 (Simon Whittaker & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2000).
247 U.C.C. §§ 1-201(b)(20), 1-304 (amended 2003) (defining "good faith" as
"honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) ("Every contract
imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and
its enforcement."). American commentators have generated scores of articles in their
attempts to define the contractual doctrine of good faith. Professor Steven Burton's
"foregone opportunity" approach and Professor Robert Summers's "excluder-
analysis" approach are the two leading approaches to good faith. See Steven J.
Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty To Perform in Good Faith, 94
HARV. L. REV. 369, 387-92 (1980); Summers, supra note 1, at 196; Robert S.
Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition and Conceptualization,
67 CORNELL L. REV. 810, 818-20 (1982).
141 WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE
LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 248-53 (2003); see also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488
A.2d 858, 889 (Del. 1985), overruled in part by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695,
713 n.54 (Del. 2009) (characterizing good faith as whether the board made "an
honest exercise of business judgment").
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have treated a corporation's failure to demonstrate good faith as
tantamount to a failure to establish compliance with the board's
"primary duty of loyalty. '249
Notwithstanding the use of good faith in other areas of the
law, and even though good faith has been mentioned in
connection with frivolous representative lawsuits for many
years, 25 ° Rule 23 does not include an explicit good faith
prerequisite. Good faith is being used in federal class action
proceedings in a penumbral manner, not as a required
prerequisite as is done in Israel.5 1 It is not clear what the
reasons for the absence of a formal good faith prerequisite are.
Three possible reasons for this absence are: (1) the alleged
difficulty in determining the appropriate standard of good
faith;25 2 (2) the preference for discrete requirements rather than a
general principle such as good faith in common law systems;253
and (3) good faith is already latent in other Rule 23 prerequisites
and, therefore, there is no reason to include an explicit good faith
prerequisite.2 54 That said, one should bear in mind that the good
faith doctrine originated in equity, as did group litigation as a
... See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182
(Del. 1986); Christopher M. Bruner, Good Faith, State of Mind, and the Outer
Boundaries of Director Liability in Corporate Law, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1131,
1149, 1156-57(2006).
250 See, e.g., Note, Extortionate Corporate Litigation: The Strike Suit, 34 COLUM.
L. REV. 1308, 1308 (1934) ("A 'strike suit' is an action brought by a security holder,
not in good faith, but, through the exploitation of its nuisance value, to force the
payment of a sum disproportionate to the normal value of his interest as the price of
discontinuance.").
"' Compare this, for example, with Canada, which also does not use good faith
as a formal prerequisite, where a bad faith allegation may be used in the
certification stage. See WARD K. BRANCH, CLASS ACTIONS IN CANADA 4-1, 4-59 (2000)
("The certification test seeks to weed out those actions which are clearly frivolous or
manifestly unfounded."). Also, the court is required to examine "the good colour of
the right," so as "to ensure that frivolous or manifestly flawed claims are not
certified." Id.
15' Attempted definitions of good faith in the United States have been criticized
as "either too abstract or applicable only to specific contexts." See, e.g., U.S. Genes v.
Vial, 923 P.2d 1322, 1325 (Or. Ct. App. 1996).
25 See, e.g., Scott Crichton Styles, Good Faith: A Principled Matter, in GOOD
FAITH IN CONTRACT AND PROPERTY 157, 176 (A.D.M. Forte ed., 2000).
25 This hypothesis is refuted infra Part VI.
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whole.2' 5 Therefore, it can be argued that good faith can be used
in class action procedure even when it is not explicitly mentioned
in Rule 23.
The next sections will explore how good faith may be said to
operate implicitly within federal class action proceedings in three
main categories: Rule 11 motions and the inherent power of
federal courts, the rules of ethics, and class action case law.
1. Rule 11 Motions and the Inherent Power of Federal Courts
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is often the
flash point for allegations of bad faith in the litigation process. If
the defendant has reasonable grounds to question the good faith
of the representative plaintiff, the defendant can move for
dismissal and sanctions under Rule 11.26 The rule, which had
previously imposed a general good faith requirement on lawyers
when they signed and filed court papers, was amended in 1983 to
hold attorneys responsible for the question of whether there was
a legal and factual basis for the claim and that the allegations
were not being presented for an improper purpose. The
amendment's purpose was to optimize the litigation process by
deterring frivolous litigation through the infliction of sanctions
on the lawyers themselves. 257 This is why, unlike the previous
version, the 1983 Rule 11 required courts to impose sanctions for
violations.
Rule 11 was again amended in 1993 after it was criticized for
creating a torrent of satellite litigation mainly on the issue of
whether the circumstances of the case warranted the imposition
of sanctions.258  Another criticism alleged that the rule
15 See, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 560-61 (1949);
HENSLER ET AL., supra note 29, at 10-11 (stating that the first provision for group
litigation in federal courts was set forth as Equity Rule 48); STEPHEN C. YEAZELL,
FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION 132-96 (1987);
Purcell, supra note 100, at 1860 n.130 ("It was not until 1833, moreover, that the
federal courts adopted their first equity rule providing for group litigation.").
251 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11. Similar, albeit more specific rules, complement Rule
11. For example, Rule 56 states that when an affidavit is submitted in bad faith, the
court must order the submitting party to pay the other party the reasonable
expenses. Id. 56(g).
257 See Burbank & Silberman, supra note 10, at 678.
258 See THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE RULE 11 SANCTIONING
PROCESS 107-23 (1988); Melissa L. Nelken, Has the Chancellor Shot Himself in the
Foot? Looking for a Middle Ground on Rule 11 Sanctions, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 383,
387-93 (1990); Burbank & Silberman, supra note 10, at 678-79.
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discouraged appropriate but zealous advocacy.259 While the 1983
version of the rule required that the legal document in question
was "well grounded in fact and... warranted by existing law or a
good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of
existing law, '2 ° the 1993 version requires class counsel to certify
that, to the best of his or her knowledge and belief formed after
an inquiry, the pleading
is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the
the cost of litigation; ... the claims . . . and other legal
contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a
nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law or the establishment of new
law; ... factual contentions have evidentiary support or ... are
likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation .... 
261
Notwithstanding the omission of the words "good faith" in
the 1993 amendment, some courts continue to use the good faith
standard when considering the certification of a claim.262 Even
though the 1993 amendment was perceived as a liberalization of
the rule,263 it still addresses in its current form concerns which
29 See, e.g., Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11-
Some "Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment,
74 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1339-43 (1986).
1cO FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (as amended in April 1983) (emphasis added); see Stephen
B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule
11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1934 (1989).
2161 FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b) (as amended in April 1993).
.26. See, e.g., Retired Chi. Police Ass'n v. Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 145
F.3d 929, 936 (7th Cir. 1998) ("That portion of the complaint was neither 'well-
grounded in fact' nor 'warranted by existing law or a good faith argument .... Such
conduct ... is violative of Rule 11 and provides a sufficient basis for the district
court's decision to impose sanctions." (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 11)); see also OWEN M.
Fiss, THE LAW AS IT COULD BE 125 (2003).
263 Justice Scalia argued that the 1993 amendment "gutted" Rule 11. See
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Forms, 146 F.R.D. 401,
509-10 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Although among other things, the 1993
amendments made sanctions discretionary and created a "safe harbor" provision, see
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1), the Federal Judicial Center study found that only a very
small percentage of judges and attorneys felt that the 1993 amendments caused an
increase of groundless litigation. JOHN SHAPARD ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REPORT
OF A SURVEY CONCERNING RULE 11, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 3 tbl.2
(1995), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/rulell.pdf/$file/.
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underlie the good faith certification prerequisite: the frivolity of
the argument and the nature of the purpose in presenting it.
26 4
That said, Rule 11 in all of its forms cannot function
similarly to the Israeli good faith prerequisite for a number of
reasons. First, since 1983, the Rule 11 standard has been viewed
as an objective, not a subjective, test, which is problematic,
assuming one believes that good faith should be subjective. 6'
Some federal courts have even determined that a litigant may
not be sanctioned under Rule 11 when his lawsuit was filed for
non-litigation purposes-such as to harass the defendant-so
long as it was objectively reasonable.6 Second, in most cases
Rule 11 is used to examine the good faith of the representative
plaintiff and class counsel ex post, after the case has already
been adjudicated and found to be without merit. At this point
the harm to the defendants is fait accompli. Moreover, the judge
knows more ex post than the plaintiff and class counsel did at ex
ante. This hindsight bias may affect the judge's view of what
constitutes a frivolous argument, and what is the nature of the
purpose of filing the claim.26 7 A good faith prerequisite will not
264 Kruzansky, supra note 124, at 1368-69 ("Though the 1993 version of Rule 11
is worded somewhat differently than its predecessor, the Rule retains the two
essential requirements ... (1) a filing may not be presented for an improper purpose,
and (2) all claims or defenses raised must be warranted by existing law or a
nonfrivolous argument for change.").
" See, e.g., Sussman v. Bank of Isr., 56 F.3d 450, 458-59 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[T]he
court is not to 'delve into the attorney's subjective intent' in filing the paper, but
rather should assess such objective factors as whether particular papers or
proceedings caused delay that was unnecessary, whether they caused increase in the
cost of litigation that was needless, or whether they lacked any apparent legitimate
purpose." (quoting William W. Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule
11 -A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181, 195 (1985))). However, commentators express the
view that even a so-called objective test is actually subjective. See William W.
Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1016 (1988) ("Although the
standard that governs attorneys' conduct is objective reasonableness, what a judge
will find to be objectively unreasonable is very much a matter of that judge's
subjective determination."); see also Charles M. Yablon, The Good, the Bad, and the
Frivolous Case: An Essay on Probability and Rule 11, 44 UCLA L. REV. 65, 77-78, 94
(1996) ("[C]laims which appear frivolous and baseless in the eyes of one judge may
seem respectable losers to others.").
"" See, e.g., Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th
Cir. 1990); Burkhart v. Kinsley Bank, 852 F.2d 512, 514-15 (10th Cir. 1988);
Sussman, 56 F.3d at 459.
26. See Yablon, supra note 265, at 78-80 (1996); see also Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORN1I. L. REV. 777,
802-03 (2001) (finding that judges are subject to hindsight bias); Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. Ciii. L.
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work post factum and, therefore, better achieve the objective of
frustrating frivolous class actions. Third, the most common
sanction imposed on the offender under Rule 11 is to pay the
opposing party's expenses. 268  This is problematic when class
actions are involved: Since the costs incurred in class actions are
immense, imposing defendant's costs on the plaintiff may deter
the filing of meritorious class actions and lower the level of
enforcement of norms determined by the legislature. 269  As
Charles Yablon correctly notes, the social cost of deterring a
winning case is far greater than the social benefit of deterring a
loser °.2 " The failure of a legal system to enforce its liability
rules increases the incentive for defendants to risk
violating those rules in the future. Moreover, as the Australian
experience proves, fee-shifting may be ineffective in impeding
frivolous litigation. 271  Fourth, Rule 11 only relates to specific
documentation. It does not empower the court to examine the
behavior and intent of the named plaintiffs and class counsel and
the way they manage the case. These reasons lead to the
conclusion that an ex ante screening mechanism is better
equipped to deal with unfounded claims than the ex post
mechanism anchored in Rule 11.272
REV. 571, 624-25 (1998) (discussing Rule 11 as an example for hindsight bias in
legal judgments).
6 Nevertheless, courts have suggested it is also possible to dismiss frivolous
claims under Rule 11, before and after the 1993 amendment. See, e.g., Top Entm't,
Inc. v. Ortega, 285 F.3d 115, 117-19 (1st Cir. 2002); Glick v. Gutbrod, 782 F.2d 754,
756 n.2 (7th Cir. 1986); Touchstone v. G.B.Q. Corp., 596 F. Supp. 805, 810 (E.D. La.
1984).
269 See, e.g., ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF
LAW 239 (2001). This is why in Israel, which usually employs the "loser pays" rule,
the ICAL determines that even if the representative plaintiff loses the case, he or
she will not pay the defendant's costs unless it is determined that the plaintiff
abused the process. One of the criteria for abuse is bad faith management of the
proceeding. Class Actions Law, 2006, S.H. 2054, § 23; see also CC 203/06 Eisenberg
v. Ne'eman Bonded Warehouse [2006] Dinim-DC 36(9) 969.
270 Yablon, supra note 265, at 101-02.
271 See Hensler & Rowe, supra note 13, at 152. Moreover, it was argued that a
major reason for the antagonism to the 1983 amendments was the attempt by some
federal judges to use Rule 11 to undermine the American attorney fees rule.
Burbank, supra note 167, at 559 n.108.
272 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
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In addition to sanctioning via Rule 11, federal courts have
the inherent power to supervise and control proceedings and to
sanction counsel or a litigant for bad faith conduct.273  Among
other sanctions, the court may deny certification of a claim. 4
However, when bad faith conduct may be sanctioned under Rule
11, the court should ordinarily rely on the rule rather than on its
inherent powers.275 This means that the inherent power may
only be used when the conduct could not be reached by Rule 11.276
Moreover, since the court is required to exercise its inherent
power with restraint,277 and use a more stringent bad faith
standard,278 court's inherent power probably cannot assist in
curbing abusive class actions.
2. Ethics Rules
According to Rule 23(g)(4), class counsel "must fairly and
adequately represent the interests of the class. '279  The breach
of this professional obligation may result in disciplinary
proceedings against class counsel. Some scholars have advocated
27:1 See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44-45 (1991) (noting that a
district court has the inherent power to "fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct
which abuses the judicial process"); see also Sussman v. Bank of Isr., 56 F.3d 450,
459-60 (2d Cir. 1995); Kovilic Constr. Co. v. Missbrenner, 106 F.3d 768, 772-73 (7th
Cir. 1997).
"' Denying certification should be viewed as parallel to dismissing a suit and,
therefore, it is under the court's discretion. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44 (noting that
the district court has an inherent power to dismiss a suit).
27 Id. at 50; Methode Elecs., Inc. v. Adam Techs., Inc., 371 F.3d 923, 927 (7th
Cir. 2004); Klein v. Stahl GMBH & Co., 185 F.3d 98, 109-10 (3d Cir. 1999).
27' Kovilic, 106 F.3d at 772-73 ("This Court has recognized the need to be
cautious when resorting to inherent powers to justify an action, particularly when
the matter is governed by other procedural rules, lest ... the restrictions in those
rules become meaningless."). In Chambers the sanctionable conduct was that the
defendants had " '(1) attempted to deprive [the] Court of jurisdiction by acts of fraud,
nearly all of which were performed outside the confines of [the] Court, (2) filed false
and frivolous pleadings, and (3) attempted, by other tactics of delay, oppression,
harassment and massive expense to reduce plaintiff to exhausted compliance.'"
Chambers, 501 U.S. at 41-42 (quoting NASCO, Inc. v. Calcasieu Television & Radio,
Inc., 124 F.R.D. 120, 138 (W.D. La. 1989)). Because the first and third acts identified
as sanctionable conduct could not be reached by Rule 11-which governs only papers
filed with a court-the Chambers Court was able to use its inherent power to impose
sanctions. Id.
211 See, e.g., Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44-45 ("Because of their very potency,
inherent powers must be exercised with restraint and discretion."); see also Klein,
185 F.3d at 110; Crowe v. Smith, 151 F.3d 217, 226 (5th Cir. 1998).
27 See, e.g., GREGORY P. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION
ABUSE § 27(B)(1), at 4-28 to -29 (4th ed. 2008).
271 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(4).
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the use of rules of legal ethics as a countermeasure to class
action abuse.280 Professor Koniak argued that the adequate
representation prerequisite is insufficient to reduce the
possibility of collusion."8 ' She proposed that the ethics rules
should serve as a vehicle for protection against class action
collusion, and should be read to require an increased duty of
candor to the court on the part of lawyers presenting class action
settlements for the court's approval.28 2
Rule 3.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct employs
good faith in a similar fashion to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, providing that a "lawyer shall not bring or
defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein,
unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not
frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension,
modification or reversal of existing law."282 Nevertheless, Rule
3.1, like the Model Rules relating to the adequacy of class
counsel,28 4 cannot effectively prevent collusive or frivolous class
actions. Professional responsibility rules are commonly used ex
post as a disciplinary action against the attorney after the
litigation has come to an end; therefore, they can only be used
as a measure of deterrence.285 Moreover, due to the nature
of professional responsibility rules, "'[o]nly the most egregious
misconduct on the part of the plaintiffs' [attorney]
could ... justify denial of class'" certification."' Furthermore, if
the representative plaintiff is not an attorney, he or she is not
bound by the rules of ethics.287
28 E.g., Bassett, supra note 91, at 958-59 (asserting that the adequacy of class
counsel review should be an ethical determination guided by the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct). However, other scholars have questioned the applicability of
legal ethics rules to class actions. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 52, at 420-21; Macey
& Miller, supra note 54, at 96-97.
21 Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem
Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1047-50, 1154 (1995).
22 Id. at 1048-49, 1121-22.
2. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2006) (emphasis added).
24 See, e.g., Id. R. 1.7 (prohibiting conflicts of interest).
... But see Macey & Miller, supra note 54, at 96 (explaining that courts
sometimes permit the defendant to inquire into the ethics of the plaintiffs' attorney,
and he or she may be disqualified if defense counsel can document conduct that
violates or arguably violates applicable ethics rules).
28 See, e.g., Underwood, supra note 58, at 816 (quoting Halverson v. Convenient
Food Mart, Inc., 458 F.2d 927, 932 (7th Cir. 1972)).
27 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl., para. 1 (2002) (addressing the
rules to lawyers who are "member[s] of the legal profession").
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3. Class Action Case Law
Good faith has been used in a sporadic manner in federal
class action proceedings. In the certification process, federal
courts have examined similar factors as those analyzed under the
auspices of the good faith prerequisite by Israeli courts.288
However, the use of the good faith standard by federal courts is
inconsistent. In most cases, courts have not examined the
motives or honesty of the plaintiff and class counsel. Arguably,
some of the cases discussed below were unusual and not widely
followed in other cases.
One prominent issue discussed in American case law is
whether the plaintiff has ulterior motives for filing the claim. In
the well-known Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin28 9 case, the Second
Circuit held that, before the court certifies the claim, it is
imperative to make sure the plaintiff is not involved in collusion
and that his or her interests are not antagonistic to those of the
remainder of the class.290 In Judge Posner's decision for the
Seventh Circuit in In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc.,2 91 he
rejuvenated the blackmail charge by noting that the class action
enables plaintiffs with weak claims to threaten an entire
industry with bankruptcy, and he decertified the class to protect
the defendants from blackmail. 292
Other decisions followed the footsteps of Rhone-Poulenc: In
Hornreich v. Plant Industries,293 the claim was dismissed after it
was held that the plaintiff filed the lawsuit only as leverage to
achieve settlements in other lawsuits he maintained against the
same defendants.294  Similarly, in another case, the court
asserted that class actions "create the opportunity for a kind of
legalized blackmail" to extract a settlement far in excess of the
2. See supra text accompanying notes 257-258.
2 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968).
'90 Id. at 562.
'91 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
22 Id. at 1304. This was not the only basis for the Seventh Circuit reversal
decision. It also dealt with the need to instruct the jury on the laws of fifty states, id.
at 1300, and with the concern that a bifurcated classwide trial would violate
defendants' Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, id. at 1303-04.
... 535 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1976).
" Id. at 551-52.
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aggregate actual value of the individual claims. 295 As seen above,
the blackmail allegation, which relates to frivolous claims, is
examined in Israel under the good faith requirement.296
Under the "adequacy" prerequisite, federal courts have
occasionally examined the honesty, conscientiousness, and good
character of the representative plaintiff and his or her attorney.
In the case of Kaplan v. Pomerantz,297 the defendants argued that
decertification was appropriate because the plaintiff gave false
answers in his deposition with respect to his involvement in
other lawsuits and his wife's ownership of other stocks.298 The
court stated in its ruling: "A plaintiffs honesty and integrity
are important considerations in allowing him to represent a
class. In this case, plaintiffs statements go beyond minor
inconsistencies. '299 The court ruled that the typicality and the
adequacy requirements were not satisfied."' The court also
found plaintiffs counsel to be inadequate by being at least a
silent accomplice in plaintiffs false testimony.0 1 In Surowitz v.
Hilton Hotels,3°2 a shareholder with a limited ability to read
English signed the verification of the complaint as the plaintiff in
a derivative action, in reliance on the investigation made by
her son-in-law and attorney.0 3 The Supreme Court held that
her lack of knowledge of the circumstances described in the
complaint should not prevent her from being a representative
plaintiff if it was demonstrated to the court that the suit was
215 In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d
768, 784-85 (3d Cir. 1995). For a survey of the variations of this charge, see Silver,
supra note 51, at 1360-85.
211 See supra Part IVA. On several occassions, the federal courts explicitly
addressed the motives of the plaintiff under the adequacy prerequisite. See, e.g.,
Kayes v. Pac. Lumber Co., 51 F.3d 1449, 1464 (9th Cir. 1995); Larson v. Dumke, 900
F.2d 1363, 1367 (9th Cir. 1990); Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365, 368 (2d Cir. 1981);
Hoffman Elec., Inc. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 754 F. Supp. 1070, 1076 (W.D. Pa. 1991);
Dorfman v. First Boston Corp., 62 F.R.D. 466, 473 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Maynard, Merel
& Co., Inc. v. Carcioppolo, 51 F.R.D. 273, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
297 132 F.R.D. 504 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
211 Id. at 505, 510; see also Armour v. Anniston, 89 F.R.D. 331, 332 (N.D. Ala.
1980).
299 Kaplan, 132 F.R.D. at 510 (internal citations omitted).
300 Id.
... Id. at 510-11; see also Pope v. Harvard Bancshares, Inc., 240 F.R.D. 383, 390
(N.D. Ill. 2006).
'02 383 U.S. 363 (1966).
311 Id. at 364-68.
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commenced in good faith and not as a nuisance or strike suit. 3°4
In Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp.,305 the court suggested that
one of the features that shows inadequacy of representation is
proof of collusion between the representative and the adverse
party. 306
Similar to Israeli courts, federal courts also ascribe
importance to the plaintiffs vindictiveness toward the
defendants.0 7 In Norman v. Arcs Equities Corp.,308 the court held
that a personal vendetta of the class plaintiff intrudes upon the
fiduciary duty of the class representative in class action
litigation.0 9  In Green v. Carlson, ° the court ruled that a
plaintiff who engages in a pattern of abuse of the judicial system
will not fairly and adequately represent the interests of the
class. 1
What this Article has identified as "issues related to good
faith" was also dealt with under Rule 23 prerequisites.1 The
question of the sophistication of the plaintiff is examined within
the scope of the typicality and adequacy prerequisites. Some
decisions state that sophisticated plaintiffs are not adequate to
represent a class of investors,3 1 3 and others have determined that
sophistication is not relevant. 14
.04 Id. at 371-72; see also Baum v. Centronics Data Computer Corp., Nos. C85-
363-L, C85-400-L, C85-417-L, C85-418-L, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25450, at *14
(D.N.H. May 15, 1986).
30 132 F.R.D. 359 (D. Del. 1990).
Id. at 381; see also Lo Re v. Chase Manhattan Corp., 431 F. Supp. 189, 197
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (finding that Rule 23(a)(4) requires lack of collusion).
0117 See, e.g., Kayes v. Pac. Lumber Co., 51 F.3d 1449, 1464 (9th Cir. 1995);
Larson v. Dumke, 900 F.2d 1363, 1367 (9th Cir. 1990); In re Itel Sec. Litig., 791 F.2d
672, 675 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that if a litigant "is substantially motivated by
vindictiveness, obduracy, or mala 'ides, the assertion of a colorable claim will not bar
the assessment of attorneys' fees" or other appropriate sanction) (internal quotation
marks omitted); Davis v. Corned, Inc., 619 F.2d 588, 593-94 (6th Cir. 1980).
o 72 F.R.D. 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
:e Id. at 506.
3' 653 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. Unit B Aug. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 944 (1981).
311 Id.
:2 See supra Part III.A.
31:1 See, e.g., Burstein v. Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 153 F.R.D 488, 490
(D. Mass. 1994) (discussing case law which held that sophisticated plaintiffs are not
typical but rejecting that view).
:14 See, e.g., Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 525-26 (1974); Hoexter
v. Simmons, 140 F.R.D. 416, 420 (D. Ariz. 1991); In re McDonnell Douglas Corp. Sec.
Litig., 98 F.D.R. 613, 620 (E.D. Mo. 1982); Wilson v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 94
F.R.D. 570, 575 (N.D.N.Y. 1982).
1332 [Vol. 83:1275
GOOD FAITH IN CLASS ACTIONS
The "professionalism" or "seriality" of the plaintiff is also
examined under the adequacy prerequisite and in the context of
lack of conflicts of interest. In most cases, courts do not attach
particular importance to the seriality of the plaintiff, except in
securities class actions in which the PSLRA specifically excludes
professional plaintiffs. The PSLRA provides that, except as the
court may otherwise permit, a person may be a lead plaintiff in
"no more than five securities class actions during any three-year
period. ' 315 In determining this limitation, Congress tried to limit
the practice of professional plaintiffs who file frivolous suits to
get a bounty.316
A unique case of "professionalism"-commonly named dual
capacity, in which the plaintiff is also class counsel or related to
the class counsel (for example, his partner or a relative)-is also
examined under the auspices of the "adequacy" requirement. 17
Many decisions have disqualified relatives of the class counsel,
his or her partners, and people who had extensive financial
relations with the class counsel from serving as class action
plaintiffs. 1  The class counsel and the plaintiff may have
conflicts of interest with the rest of the class,319 since in these
cases no one guards the interests of the class.32 ° Other cases
were decided otherwise, especially when the fees of the class
counsel were paid directly by the defendant and not as part of the
compensation given to the class.32 1
... Miller, supra note 42, at 595 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(a)(3)B(v),
78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v)).
116 H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 32-33 (1995) (Conf. Rep.).
317 See, e.g., Bradburn Parent/Teacher Store v. 3M, No. 02-7676, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16193, at *35, *38-39 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2004) (concluding that, since the
majority shareholder of the plaintiff was married to one of the plaintiffs attorneys,
the attorney was unable to adequately represent the class); In re Microsoft Corp.
Antitrust Litig., 214 F.R.D. 371, 374-75 (D. Md. 2003) (finding that a representative
plaintiff was inadequate to represent the class because she was the sister-in-law of
one of the attorneys for the plaintiffs).
31 See, e.g., Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 561 F.2d 86, 90 (7th Cir. 1977)
(noting that the majority of courts "have refused to permit class attorneys, their
relatives, or business associates from acting as the class representative").
319 See generally Neil L. Rock, Note, Class Action Counsel as Named Plaintiff
Double Trouble, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 111 (1987).
320 See, e.g., Holland v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 75 F.R.D. 743, 748 (N.D.
Ohio 1975).
... See, e.g., Phillips v. Joint Legislative Comm., 637 F.2d 1014, 1024 (5th Cir.
Miss. 1981); Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085, 1089-1090, 1091 (3d
Cir. Pa. 1976).
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Good faith is sometimes used when a request to approve a
class action settlement is filed. In many decisions, the court
approved the class settlement only after finding that it was the
"product of extensive arm's length negotiations ... undertaken in
good faith.., after substantial factual investigation and legal
analysis. 322 The test courts have used to determine if the Rule
23(e) requirements have been satisfied is whether a class action
settlement is "fair, adequate and reasonable and is not the
product of collusion between the parties. '323 This test comprises
two queries: (1) a "substantive" query, which examines whether
the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable; and (2) a
"procedural" query, which examines whether the settlement is
the product of collusion between the parties or of negotiations
conducted in good faith.324 One commentator asserts that the
procedural standard is more frequently used because it is easier
to implement. 325  The procedural standard is comparable to the
Israeli good faith standard.
With regards to good faith in class action settlements, in
addition to verifying the fairness of the settlement, the good faith
of the parties decreases "the probability of collateral attack by
absentees if the settlement is approved. '326 As seen, good faith is
322 See, e.g., In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., No. 99-197, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8931, at :22 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2000). A similar wording was recently suggested by the
American Law Institute. See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE
LITIGATION, § 3.05(a)(4) (Proposed Final Draft Apr. 1, 2009) ("A court reviewing the
fairness of proposed class-action settlement must address ... whether: (4) the
settlement was negotiated at arm's length and was not the product of collusion.").
... Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1330 (5th Cir. 1977); see also Grunin v. Int'l
House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114. 123 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 864
(1975).
324 See, e.g., Cook v. Powell Buick, Inc., 155 F.3d 758, 762 (5th Cir. 1998),
abrogated by Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1 (2002); Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe
Co. (Pettway IV), 576 F.2d 1157, 1217-19 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115
(1979); Weinberg v. Lear Fan Corp., 627 F. Supp. 719, 724 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Smyth v.
Kaspar Am. State Bank, 136 N.E.2d 796, 805 (Ill. 1956), superseded by statute, 735
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-801 (1982), as recognized in Steinberg v. Chi. Med. Sch., 371
N.E.2d 634, 644 (Ill. 1977). When determining whether a settlement is fair,
reasonable, and adequate, some courts examine, among other criteria, the presence
of good faith and the absence of collusion. See, e.g., City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp.,
495 F.2d 448, 463 (2d Cir. 1974), abrogated on other grounds by Goldberger v.
Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2000).
125 G. Donald Puckett, Note, Peering into a Black Box: Discovery and Adequate
Attorney Representation for Class Action Settlements, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1271, 1310-13
(1999).
121 NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 73, § 15:26. If the adequacy of representation
was such that some or all of the absent class members could not fairly have been
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related to acts of collusion between counsel and defendants,
where counsel is generously compensated for arranging a
settlement less favorable to the class than suggested by the
merits .327
Good faith has also been mentioned with regard to the
selection of the lead plaintiff under the PSLRA. In one case, the
court ruled that "[t]he lead plaintiff owes a fiduciary duty to all
members of the proposed class to provide fair and adequate
representation and actively to work with class counsel to obtain
the largest recovery for the proposed class consistent with good
faith and meritorious advocacy. 328
The next Part of this Article examines the key differences
between American and Israeli legal systems and especially the
different role that litigation plays in each society. This article
concludes that such differences do not justify the differences
concerning the application of good faith in class action
proceedings.
V. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF LITIGATION IN
THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL
When considering the adoption of a good faith requirement
into federal class action certification procedure, it is important to
inquire, first, whether the role litigation plays in the American
and Israeli legal systems is similar, and second, whether the
adoption will not disrupt other parts of the procedural system.329
Concerning the latter, since the certification procedure is
particular to class action proceedings, it should not disrupt in any
way the federal procedural system as a whole. Even though the
former question is not so self-evident, this Article argues that the
represented by those who appeared as parties, the judgement will not bind them. See
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940); see also Richards v. Jefferson County,
517 U.S. 793, 798, 800-01 (1996).
327 See, e.g., Barboza v. Ford Consumer Fin. Co., No. 94-12352-GAO, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14170, at *18 (D. Mass. Jan. 30, 1998), superseded by statute,
12 U.S.C. § 2607(a) (2006), as recognized in Golan v. Ohio Sav. Bank, No. 98-C-7430,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16452, at *15-16 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 14, 1999).
328 In re Network Assocs. Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 1999)
(emphasis added); see also In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 276 (3d Cir.
2001) ("[T]he ultimate inquiry is always whether the lead plaintiffs choices were the
result of a good faith selection and negotiation process and were arrived at via
meaningful arms-length bargaining.").
329 See, e.g., Scott Dodson, The Challenge of Comparative Civil Procedure, 60
ALA. L. REV. 133, 143 (2008).
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role litigation plays in both systems is similar enough so that a
transplant of the good faith requirement should not be
problematic.
While the United States and Israel both have adversarial
legal systems,33 ° some differences still exist. A prominent
difference is that Israel has only one homogeneous judicial
system as opposed to the state-federal divide in the United
States.33 ' Also, Israel does not conduct jury trials.3 2 However,
Israel does share a lot of what Robert Kagan has termed
American "adversarial legalism. 333  As elaborated below, there
can be no dispute that litigation plays a fundamental and similar
role in Israeli and American societies. The two legal systems rely
upon private litigants to enforce substantive provisions of law
that, in civil law legal systems, are left mostly to the discretion of
public enforcement agencies.
330 Oscar G. Chase, American "Exceptionalism" and Comparative Procedure, 50
AM. J. COMP. L. 277, 286 (2002) (noting that the American "conflict-solving mode of
procedure fits best with a laissez-faire state, [and therefore] 'the American legal
process allocates an unusually wide range of procedural action to the adverse
parties, especially in trial preparation, creating opportunities for free procedural
enterprise unparalleled in other countries.'" (quoting MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, THE
FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY 108 (1991) (second alteration in original)));
Stephen Goldstein, Relationships Between the Parties, the Judges and the Lawyers in
the Israeli Litigation System, in 3 XII CONGRESO MUNDIAL DE DERECHO PROCESAL
363, 363 (Marcel Storme & Cipriano Gomez Lara eds., 2005) ("The Israeli litigation
system is based on the English adversary system that leaves the conduct of the
litigation primarily in the hands of the parties and their lawyers."). But see William
T. Pizzi, The American "Adversary System"?, 100 W. VA. L. REV. 847, 847 (1998)
(arguing that there is no clear line between adversarial and inquisitorial trial
systems).
331 Indeed, in addition to the general court system, Israel employs a system of
religious tribunals. However, these tribunals are subjected to the authority of the
secular court system, and they only have jurisdiction in issues that relates to
religion (mainly marriage and divorce).
3.2 See, e.g., Uri Shtrusman, The Naked King or the Dominance of the Jury in
Israeli Court, 13(1) YIUNEY MISHPAT 175, 207 (1988).
:33 KAGAN, supra note 269, at 9.
[Vol. 83:12751336
GOOD FAITH IN CLASS ACTIONS
A. American "Adversarial Legalism"
Professor Kagan argues that the United States is exceptional
in comparison to other economically advanced democracies.334 He
coined the expression "adversarial legalism" to describe what he
terms the "American way of law." '335 Kagan sees this as a legal
style that emphasizes litigant activism and lawyer-dominated
litigation in dispute resolution, policy making, and policy
implementation. 36 In the United States, Kagan argues, the
courts have become a central source of resource allocation due to
weak hierarchical control of the judiciary and fragmented
political authority.3 37 Adversarial legalism refers to the role law
plays in policy implementation, to the centrality of the courts in
disputes and policy controversies, and the way that so many
social, political, and economic issues are refashioned in legal
terms.338
Adversarial legalism, Kagan claims, is a characteristic of
America that other advanced nations do not share, and they are
the better for it.339 Even those who do not concur with Kagan's
approach agree that in the United States, more significant issues
"' Id. at 7; see also SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: A
DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD 17-18 (1996) (stating that American "exceptionalism" has
been observed by Alexis de Tocqueville in the 1830s); Stephen B. Burbank, The
Complexity of Modern American Civil Litigation: Curse or Cure?, 91 JUDICATURE
163, 165 (2008) ("[P]rivate litigation plays a role in American society that is probably
unique in the world."); Chase, supra note 330, at 287-301 (describing characteristics
of the American procedural exceptionalism as part of America's cultural
exceptionalism); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEX. L.
REV. 1665, 1674 (1998) ("The American common-law system ... has differences from
most other common-law systems that are of equally great if not greater significance
[than those seperating common-law from civil law systems]. The American system is
unique in many respects.").
... In his article, On Surveying the Whole Legal Forest, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
833, 837 (2003), Professor Kagan explains that he used the term adversarial legalism
"to refer both to the 'day-to-day practice of adversarial legal contestation,' and to a
complex of legal institutions, mechanisms, rights, and rules that facilitate or
encourage adversarial, party-dominated legal contestation-what might be called
'the structures of adversarial legalism.' "
316 See KAGAN, supra note 269, at 9.
337 See id. at 9, 40.
311 See generally id. at chs. III-IV.
311 See id. at 6-9.
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may be litigated than in other developed countries, so that
American courts play a greater role in determining
comprehensive government policy.
34 °
Like others, 34' Kagan also recognizes that other nations
share some aspects of American adversarial legalism, 342 but
he argues that the American legal system is substantially
different in the level of adversarial legalism . 43  Americans are
"distinctive," as Kagan has put it, by being "especially inclined to
authorize and encourage the use of adversarial litigation to
implement public policies and resolve disputes ... as a matter of
day-to-day practice. 344 Moreover, he refers to the fact that in the
United States the government has increasingly given private
citizens the power to bring lawsuits to enforce statutes.345 While
"European polities generally rely on hierarchically organized
national bureaucracies to hold local officials accountable to
national policies, the United States Congress mobilized a
distinctly American army of enforcers-a decentralized,
4 See Frank B. Cross, Book Review: America the Adversarial, 89 VA. L. REV.
189, 190 (2003) (reviewing KAGAN, supra note 269). David Nelken argues that what
we can be certain is that in other countries litigation is allowed a much smaller role
than in the United States. See David Nelken, Beyond Compare? Criticizing "The
American Way of Law," 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 799, 819 (2003).
.34 See Charles R. Epp, The Judge over Your Shoulder: Is Adversarial Legalism
Exceptionally American?, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 743, 754 (2003). See generally R.
Daniel Kelemen & Eric C. Sibbitt, The Americanization of Japanese Law, 23 U. PA.
J. INT'L ECON. L. 269 (2002) (offering a study of the "Americanization" of the
Japanese legal system).
342 See KAGAN, supra note 269, at 12. See generally Robert A. Kagan, Should
Europe Worry About Adversarial Legalism?, 17 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1997)
(examining some evidence of the growth of adversarial legalism in Europe).
4" See KAGAN, supra note 269, at 7-8. Kagan identifies thirty-four previous
comparative studies covering various policy areas that have deduced that America
has a distinctive adversarial legalism. Id.
.4" Id. at 13. The litigious nature of the American people is exemplified by
Justice Warren Burger's statement that "mass neurosis ... leads people to think
courts were created to solve all the problems of society." Arthur R. Miller, The
Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the "Litigation Explosion," "Liability Crisis," and
Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 989 (2003); see also E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 32 (1988); JOHN THIBAULT & LAURENS
WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 107 (1975); Donna
Shestowsky & Jeanne Brett, Disputants' Perceptions of Dispute Resolution
Procedures: An Ex Ante and Ex Post Longitudinal Empirical Study, 41 CONN. L.
REV. 63, 93 (2008) (stating that, while nonadjudicative procedures failed to meet
disputants' expectations, those initially selecting adjudicative procedures-such as
trial or arbitration-were highly satisfied ex post).
"' See KAGAN, supra note 269, at 51.
1338 [Vol. 83:1275
GOOD FAITH IN CLASS ACTIONS
ideologically motivated array of private advocacy groups and
lawyers.""" Kagan takes particular aim at tort law in the United
States. While most other developed nations have a broad social
insurance system to assist injured individuals, the United States
relies heavily on private litigation to achieve these ends. 47
Kagan refers to the disturbing implications of adversarial
legalism as a system of law that relies on a politically
selected judiciary,348 lay jury trials, entrepreneurial lawyering,
and aggressive pretrial discovery. 49  These features of
adversarial legalism are said to generate enormous costs,
excessive unpredictability, frequent injustice, and excessive
inequality.5  Kagan contrasts America's politically selected,
decentralized judiciary with the bureaucratically organized,
career-management system that homogenizes the judiciaries in
Europe and makes their decisions more "legally competent,
uniform, and predictable" than decisions rendered by their less
regulated American counterparts. 51
Joseph Sanders argues that nonadversarial responses are
rare in the United States due to the interaction of legal culture
and legal structure.3 5 '  He compares the United States with
Japan, which has been governed by an entrenched, professional
national bureaucracy.353 Unlike the United States, Japan has a
more communal and less individualistic culture. 4 The Japanese
are less likely to view a person as an autonomous individual than
as someone embedded in a social context.3 " The American
individualistic culture, on the other hand, supports adversarial
:"' Id. at 47.
17 See id. at 129-31.
c See Joseph Sanders, Adversarial Legalism and Civil Litigation: Prospects for
Change, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 719, 724 (2003); cf. David T. Johnson, American
Law in Japanese Perspective, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 771, 780-81 (2003) (noting
that America's politically selected judiciary may be less "political" than Japan's
career judiciary because Japanese judges are predictably conservative).
... See KAGAN, supra note 269, at 103.
", See id. at 104-25. But see Johnson, supra note 348, at 772 (arguing that
Kagan exaggerates when he depicts the implications of American adversarial
legalism).
351 KAGAN, supra note 269, at 111-12.
", See Sanders, supra note 348, at 734-35; see also Chase, supra note 330, at
279 (stating that distinctions in litgation are "traceable to underlying cultural
differences").
""" Sanders, supra note 348, at 734-35.
d4 h . at 735.
3K Id.
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legalism for it justifies the choice to pursue one's own best
interest even when people believe this choice may harm some
other social good. '
Kagan also argues that the American fees rule, requiring
each party to bear its own litigation costs, encourages "legally
questionable cases" and harms those with "clearly meritorious
claims and defenses. 35 7 He asserts that American laws involve
more costly forms of legal contestation, which he believes is not
merely inefficient, but also compels litigants to abandon just
claims and defenses. 358
B. "Adversarial Legalism" in Israel
The quote "America remains a society profoundly rooted in
law ''3" describes the Israeli society as well. The Israeli legal
system not only shares most of the features of the American
adversarial legalism, but the role of litigation in Israel also bears
a close resemblance to its American counterpart. Indeed, some
legal scholars support the argument that the Unites States is not
exceptional, in many of the attributes of adversarial legalism, as
Professor Kagan argues. 360 First, some of the possible reasons for
the similarity between the two legal systems in historical terms
will be explored. Next, the common characteristics of American
and Israeli litigation will be examined in more detail.
"' See id. at 736; Chase, supra note 330, at 281.
157 KAGAN, supra note 269, at 239.
158 See id. at 117; Nelken, supra note 340, at 828 ("[T]here are few who would
doubt that American society is subject to a relatively high and costly level of
litigation.").
35 LIPSET, supra note 334, at 270.
.. Epp, supra note 341, at 766 (stating that "much of the comparative legal
research of the last generation demonstrates that the United States is
not.., exceptional in many of the attributes of adversarial legalism, nor is the
limited reach of adversarial legal reforms exceptional"); Nelken, supra note 340, at
811-12, 824 ("The Anglo-American model of law, of party-led negotiated justice is
coming to seem the norm even in continental Europe."). Yet, Nelken supports
Kagan's view that countries outside the United States are still less subject to legal
adversarialism, and that "absent the special conditions which shape law in the
United States they will not go the same way." Id. at 824. Kagan himself asserts in a
recent article that "politically driven adversarial litigation sometimes occurs in
Great Britain, Germany..., The Netherlands.... and even in Japan." Kagan,
supra note 335, at 837-38, 841-42. Yet, Kagan insists that the United States is still
exceptional with regard to "the ways in which laws are articulated and implemented,
legal disputes are adjudicated, violations punished, and arguments made and
resolved." Id.
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In the early years after the establishment of the State of
Israel in 1948, collective culture-according to which the
individual was seen as an instrument for fulfillment of the
State's goals-was dominant.361  As a result of the increasing
influence of American culture in the 1970s and 1980s, a new
parallel framework of values arose based on the values of self-
fulfillment and individualism. 62  The reformation of Israeli
culture influenced tremendously the Israeli legal system and had
a significant impact on the reasoning of the justices on the Israeli
Supreme Court. Due to the cultural shifts in Israel from a
collective society that valued solidarity to a more individualized
society in which the individual and his or her well being is of the
outmost importance, the Israeli Supreme Court, which previously
based its decisions on formalism, now relies on liberal values.363
This argument requires clarification: Mautner argues that the
reason for the change in the court's reasoning was intentional
and premeditated.6 4 Whereas in the first twenty-five years after
the establishment of the State, Israeli culture was based on
collective values, and the legal culture of the Court was based on
liberal values, the Israeli Supreme Court justices had used legal
formalism in their decisions. Formalism enabled the Court to
conceal the ideological dimension of its decisions and present the
judicial process as a mechanical process that leads to inevitable
decisions that are not influenced or shaped by ideological values
of the members of the Court. Put differently, legal formalism
enabled the Court to conceal the cultural gap between Israeli
society and the Israeli Supreme Court justices. Due to the
cultural change in Israeli society in the 1970s, there was no
further need to use rigid legal formalism, which is ostensibly
value-neutral, and the Court has openly articulated liberal
values in its decisions. 65
'6 See, e.g., DAN HOROVITZ & MOSHE LISK, HARDSHIPS IN UTOPIA 153-54
(1990).
162 MENACHEM MAUTNER, THE DECLINE OF FORMALISM AND THE RISE OF
VALUES IN ISRAELI LAW 125 (1993); Goldstein & Ephron, supra note 189 at 47.
363 MAUTNER, supra note 362, at 122-25. According to Mautner, this transition
was accompanied by a transition in Israeli jurisprudence, first influenced by
England and later by the United States. Id. at 138. Pertaining to the liberalism of
the Israeli Supreme Court, see also Shimon Shetreet, Reflections on the
Contemporary Trends of Judicial Role in Israeli Society, in THE ROLE OF COURTS IN
SOCIETY 158, 160-61 (Shimon Shetreet ed., 1988).
364 MAUTNER, supra note 362, at 122-25.
: Id. at 122-27.
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Therefore, since the late 1970s, the status quo has changed-
the Israeli Supreme Court's legal reasoning has emphasized the
ideological content of the law and its social meaning. 366  Since
then, the Court has begun to use the law as an educational
mechanism and not merely as a vehicle for dispute
resolution. This is somewhat similar to Alexis de Tocqueville's
characterization of American democracy as a society in which all
political questions are eventually brought for judicial ruling.1 7
Therefore, one can argue that the same description also depicts
Israel, where central social decisions are ultimately made by the
Israeli Supreme Court.
This change in the court's legal reasoning has had several
repercussions. The Israeli Supreme Court has openly intervened
in ideological and political questions, which were considered to be
non-justiciable before.368 A few prominent examples are: (1) the
overturning of previous decisions of the Court according to which
political agreements were determined to be not justiciable,""
(2) the failure to call Yeshiva students for compulsory army
service, 370 and (3) the ruling that the expropriation of land in an
area under Israeli military occupation for the purpose of
establishing a settlement is unlawful.3 7  These decisions on
political issues may be parallel to the decision of the United
"" The underlying assumption of American procedure is that judicial discretion
is to be preferred to formalism. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 167, at 543.
367 See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 93-96 (Harvey C.
Mansfield & Delba Winthrop eds., Univ. of Chi. Press 2000); Ruth Gabizon, Public
Involvement of the Supreme Court of Justice: Critical View, in JUDICIAL AcTIVISM:
PROS AND CONS 69, 106-07 (2000).
'- See AHARON BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY 177-S9 (2006) (discussing
the question of justiciability under Israeli law). Barak believes that in modern
democracies, increasingly, political questions are dressed as legal matters and that
the court should address these questions. See Aharon Barak, The Role of the Judge
in a Democracy, (May 1, 2003), http://www.court.org.il/sun/. Barak believes that the
judicialization of politics will continue and that the non-justiciability of legal aspects
of politics will decrease. BARAK, supra at 368; see also RUTI GAVISON, MORDECHAI
KREMNITZER & YOAV DOTAN, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM, FOR AND AGAINST: TtIE ROLE OF
THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE IN ISRAELI SOCIETY 65 (2000).
169 Compare HCJ 313/67 Exelrod v. Minister of Religion [1968] IsrSC 22(1) 80,
with HCJ 669/86 Rubin v. Berger [1987] IsrSC 41(1) 73, and HCJ 1523/90 Levi v.
Prime Minister of Isr. [19901 IsrSC 44(2) 213 (determining that political agreements
are justiciable and legally binding).
:17' HCJ 3267/97 Rubinstein v. Minister of Defence [19981 IsrSC 52(5) 481: HCJ
6427/02 Movement for Quality Gov't in Isr. v. Knesset [2006] Dinim-SC 74, 544.
171 HCJ 390/79 Dawikat v. Israel [1979] IsrSC 34(1) 1.
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States Supreme Court to hear Bush v. Gore372 rather than
abstain on the grounds of non-justiciability, which was also
widely criticized.373 The former President, Barak, was perhaps
the most prominent supporter of reducing non-justiciability to
bridge the gap between law and society and protect the
constitution and democracy.3 74  It is no wonder that Barak
supports the position of the United States Supreme Court, which
did not dismiss Bush v. Gore for non-justiciability.375
The change in the Israeli Supreme Court's legal reasoning
has also amplified the role of litigation in Israel. The less formal
legal reasoning and depreciation of the importance of
justiciability issues has invited even more litigation.376
Beyond American influences on the Israeli Supreme Court,
another reason for the similar role litigation plays in both legal
systems comes to mind. Since the two countries share a common
law heritage, it should not come as a surprise that similar
national traits played on that shared heritage in similar ways.
Moreover, the fact that both countries were founded by
immigrants, who continue to arrive, could make them more open
to cultural and legal changes. It is easier for newcomers to
achieve those changes using litigation rather than through
political power.377
Many of the characteristics of Kagan's "adversarial legalism"
are also present in Israel. Israel, too, is overburdened by
excessive civil litigation. Courts' dockets are full and decisions
372 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
... See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Political Questions and the Hazards of Pragmatism,
in BUSH V. GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY 145, 145-46 (Bruce Ackerman ed.,
2002); see also Steven G. Calabresi, A Political Question, in BUSH V. GORE: THE
QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY, supra at 138.
17' BARAK, supra note 368, at 177. Even though Israel does not have a written
constitution, it does have "basic laws," which are treated similarly by the Court. See
Amos Shapira, The Supreme Court as Guardian of the Individual's Fundamental
Freedoms in Israel-A Fortified Bastion or a Paper Tiger, 3 YIUNEY MISHPAT 625,
630 (1978).
175 BARAK, supra note 368, at 188.
"" Mautner, supra note 362, at 105-07.
277 This argument does not explain why the government chooses to use litigation
rather than agency enforcement. It does explain, however, why litigation is so often
used in both countries.
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are often delayed. 378 Arguably, the Israeli legal system may even
be in worse condition, since relatively fewer cases are being
settled and more proceed to trial.379
Kagan blames American adversarial legalism for high costs
and unwarranted delays.3 80  These same features exist in the
Israeli legal system. Indeed, plaintiff attorney fees in Israel are
usually lower, 38 ' but discovery procedures are extensive as
customary in the United States. Israel employs the "loser pays"
rule similarly to England. This rule may deter lawyers from
filing a frivolous claim and, in doing so, lower the cost imposed on
the judiciary. Even though this seems significant due to the
17' According to a study commissioned by the Israeli Court System Management,
which compared judicial caseload burden in Israel and sixteen other developed
countries (United States not included), Israel is ranked third in judicial burden
based on the criteria for counting court cases. See RAANAN SULITZEANU-KENAN ET
AL., THE BURDEN ON JUDICIARIES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF 17 COUNTRIES:
SUMMARIZING REPORT 3-4 (2007). In the level of legal activity, defined by the ratio
of cases to population size, Israel is ranked first, while in the ratio of population to
judges it is ranked sixth. Id. According to the study, in the year 2004 there were
1,016 civil cases per judge, id., while, according to the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, in the year 2000 there were only 311 cases per federal judge,
see supra note 118. While the evaluated parameters may be slightly different in both
studies, the immense burden on Israeli judges is evident.
Even though, to the best of my knowledge, no statistical study was done in
Israel pertaining to settlements in "simple" civil cases, it is evident that much more
than three to five percent of the cases end with final judgments. See HENSLER ET.
AL., supra note 29, at 126 n.52; Michael Heise, Justice Delayed?: An Empirical
Analysis of Civil Case Disposition Time, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 813, 823 (2000).
Regarding class actions, only 4 out of 215 class actions filed between the years 1995-
2000 were either won or settled in favor of the class; this number does not include
class actions in which the claim was settled for a nuisance value. See Deutsch, supra
note 236, at 310. These numbers may have changed since the legislation of the ICAL
in 2006.
"' KAGAN, supra note 269, at 4. But see Herbert M. Kritzer, American
Adversarialism, 38 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 349, 368-72 (2004) (critisizing Kagan's
conclusions).
""1 Attorney fees in Israeli class actions range between five and fifteen percent,
which often includes the reward to the representative plaintiff, while in the United
States it ranges between twenty and thirty percent in relatively small lawsuits and
about ten percent in large ones. See AMICHAI MAGEN & PERETZ SEGAL, THE
GLOBALIZATION OF CLASS ACTIONS: NATIONAL REPORT: ISRAEL 46-47 (2007);
Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements:
An Empirical Study, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 27, 77 (2004).
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limited use of Rule 11 since the 1993 amendments,382 in fact
Israeli courts rarely require the plaintiff to pay the defendant's
costs in class action proceedings.383
Kagan emphasizes the role of American lawyers, their
unique drive, and their large numbers relative to other countries
as evidence that the law plays a larger role in America's
economy.38 4 However, the number of Israeli lawyers per capita is
even higher, and commentators have highlighted this fact as a
reason for the growing numbers of class actions filed.38 5
In Israel, as in the United States, judges had traditionally
remained relatively passive.3 6  However, in both the United
States and Israel, judges have begun to take a more active role in
policy making. 387 The courts are entrusted with what has been
named "structural reform," where, rather than existing merely to
resolve disputes, "courts exist to give meaning to ... public
values . ".."388 One prominent example is class action
proceedings in which judges have necessarily taken a more active
role. 389 "While the court does not fully occupy the inquisitorial
role of civil law tradition, it comes close. 91 Similar to the 2006
Israeli Class Actions Law, the enactment of the PSLRA and the
2003 amendments to Rule 23 signal an even greater role for the
courts in the appointment of class counsel. 391  As others have
32 See supra notes 123-124 and accompanying text.
113 See supra note 269; Amir Helmer, Small Calculation-Great Importance,
HAARETZ, Feb. 15, 2004.
3'4 KAGAN, supra note 269, at 55-57.
"' Goldstein & Ephron, supra note 362, at 47-48; Burbank, supra note 334, at
165. Kagan states that in the year 1995 the ratio was 1:307, KAGAN, supra note 269,
at 36, while, according to statistics obtained from the Israeli Bar, in the beginning of
2009 there were 40,469 lawyers, a ratio of 1:183. See Ela Levi-Weinrib, Israeli
Lawyers Face Increasingly Crowded Field, GLOBES, May 20, 2009, at 10. Indeed,
many of these lawyers do not litigate and some do not practice, but the numbers still
illustrate the role of the law in Israeli culture.
. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
... See Shetreet, supra note 363, at 159-61, 470 (discussing the shift in the
function of judges in Israel); Shimon Shetreet, Judicial Independence and
Accountability in Israel, 33 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 979, 980-83 (1984); Robert M.
McKay, Civil Litigation and the Public Interest, 31 U. KAN. L. REV. 355, 364 (1983).
Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of
Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 29 (1979).
... See supra note 117.
3.0 Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 64, at 1707.
"" See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 61, §§ 10.23, 21.27.
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determined, this phenomenon is part of a larger trend: Israeli
and American judges in general are becoming more involved and
have obtained a more active role in court proceedings. 92
Kagan reasons that since the government in the United
States is too weak to deal with the needs of modern society,
litigation provides the alternative route for obtaining justice.193
The fact that Israel also possesses a weak government 394
contributed to the Israeli Supreme Court's intervention in purely
political matters. Likewise, in Israel, trust in government has
declined. 395  This phenomenon has also fueled the reliance on
litigation instead of political leadership.396
Kagan and others argue that jury trials influence American
adversarial legalism as well. He argues that a jury is less
predictable than professionally trained judges397 and that "olin
average, jury trials take longer than bench trials. '39" As
mentioned above, Israel has never used jury trials, even though
they originated in England,399 from which Israel drew its Rules of
Civil Procedure. 40 0 The absence of juries, however, is not a
significant factor in comparing the roles played by litigation in
the two countries.4 1 First, recent empirical evidence refutes
Kagan's argument that jury trials last longer.4 2 Second, the
39 Dodson, supra note 329, at 148-50; Stephen Goldstein, Forty Years of Israeli
Civil Procedure, 19 MISHPATIM 663 (1989-1990) (describing the softening of
traditional principles of classic adversarial concepts, and the controlled adoption of
principles from the inquisitorial system).
KAGAN, supra note 269, at 15-16.
See, e.g., A Systemic Problem, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 5, 2008, at 13 (analyzing
Israel's weak fragmented political system).
"' See id.
"9 See KAGAN, supra note 269, at 35-37; Burbank, supra note 334, at 165;
MAUTNER, supra note 362, at 134-36.
" KAGAN, supra note 269, at 116; Sanders, supra note 348, at 727.
... Sanders, supra note 348, at 723.
i"" Presently, civil jury trials are rarely used in the United Kingdom. See MARY
ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 532 (2d ed. 1994).
... Amos Shapira & Eran B. Taussig, Group Actions in Israel-National Report
2, The Committee on International Civil Litigation of the International Law
Association (2006).
401 Even Japan has began to experiment with juries but, nevertheless, no scholar
would label it "adversarial." See Robert M. Bloom, Jury Trials in Japan, 28 LOY.
L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 35, 36-37 (2006); The Jury Is Out, THE ECONOMIST, Feb.
14, 2009, at 70.
42 Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermont, Trial by Jury or Judge: Which Is
Speedier?, 79 JUDICATURE 176, 177-79 (1996); Stephen B. Burbank, Keeping Our
Ambition Under Control: The Limits of Data and Inference in Searching for the
Causes and Consequences of Vanishing Trials in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL
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recent United States Supreme Court decision in Twombly,
regarding a heightened pleading standard, 4°3 and the more
stringent standards for scrutinizing the reliability of scientific
evidence," 4 can be viewed as part of a trend toward limiting the
cases that are allowed to be decided by jury in the United States.
On the face of it, compared with the United States, Israel
does have a much more comprehensive social security system, a
bureaucratic body which supports the unemployed, injured, and
sick, and a no-fault compensation system for motor vehicle
accidents. Moreover, as Israel has become more of a welfare
state, legislation has been passed to regulate the rights and the
duties of citizens and government authorities. Paradoxically,
this has resulted in a corresponding increase in litigation against
government agencies."'
Furthermore, at least in some aspects, there are signs of
decline in American adversarial legalism.40 6  A prominent
example is the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund,
which was created by Congress to compensate the victims of the
attack in exchange for their agreement not to sue the airline
corporations involved.40 7 At the end of the process, 70 billion
dollars were awarded to 97% of the families.408  Only
approximately eighty-five people decided not to come into the
program and instead decided to sue.40 9 Also, many United States
LEGAL STUD. 571, 587 (2004) (stating that "the time from filing to disposition is now
shorter for jury trials than it is for bench trials").
403 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569-70 (2007).
40. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588-90 (1993).
401 Shimon Shetreet, Judging in Society: The Changing Role of Courts, in THE
ROLE OF COURTS IN SOCIETY, supra note 363, at 470-71; see also KAGAN, supra note
269, at 162-63.
... See, e.g., Christopher B. Busch et al., Taming Adversarial Legalism: The Port
of Oakland's Dredging Saga Revisited, 2 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 179, 204-07
(1999) (illustrating how modifications in the United State's adversarial legalism
structure would affect dredging policy).
407 See September l1th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Pub. L. No.107-42,
§§ 401-09, 115 Stat. 230, 237-41; Interview by Bob Abernethy, Executive Editor and
Host of Religion & Ethics Newsweekly with Kenneth Feinberg, Lawyer (Aug. 29,
2005), available at http://www.pbs.org/wnet/religionandethics/week901/interview.
html.
40 Interview with Kenneth Feinberg, supra note 407.
40 See id. Mr. Feinberg said that "taking away that right to sue, which is such
an inherent part of American culture, heritage, is not an easy thing to do." Id. He
described this program as "a unique response to a very unique event." Id. Therefore,
unless it becomes a reoccurring phenomenon, it may not support a supposed decline
in American adversarial legalism.
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Supreme Court rulings have consciously sought to depress
adversarial legalism. Prominent examples already discussed in
this Article include Twombly, Tellabs, and Iqbal.41  These
decisions and others, such as the Daubert decision and its
progeny, dictate greater judicial involvement in assessing the
merits of plaintiffs' claims at the early stages of the litigation and
can be viewed as an effort to prevent lawyers from filing dubious
lawsuits-including class actions. Congress has also curbed class
action litigation with, inter alia, the enactment of PSLRA and
CAFA, which, as seen, may impede meritorious class action
litigation.
These and other indications of decline in American
adversarial legalism do not seem to fundamentally change the
important role litigation plays in the American legal system.
Even though adversarial legalism is still deeply rooted in the
American legal system and in American political culture, the
Israeli legal system does not seem far behind.
This Article does not argue that the role that litigation plays
in American and Israeli societies is identical. It merely suggests
that the Israeli legal system reflects many of the characteristics
of American "adversarial legalism" and that litigation plays a
similar role in both legal systems.
C. Should Differences in the Role of Litigation Influence the
Implementation of Good Faith?
As seen, the differences in the roles that litigation plays
in American and Israeli societies are not significant and,
therefore, probably should not affect the role that a "good faith"
requirement can usefully play in each system.4 11  In both
systems, law plays a similar role in policy implementation,
courts' decisions are key in disputes and policy controversies, and
many social, political, and economic issues are refashioned in
legal terms. The fact that Israel uses class actions as a
mechanism to implement social change412-very much in the
410 See supra text accompanying notes 152-163.
This does not necessarily mean that the remaining differences should not
affect the content that should be given to good faith in each society. This question
exceeds the boundaries of this Article and may be part of a future project.
41 See HCJ 4601/95 Sarusi v. Labor Court [1998] IsrSC 52(4) 817, 826 (holding
that the law-and therefore litigation-is a social tool). "The concepts of the law
were meant to achieve social goals .... They are expression[sl for appropriate
balances between contradicting values and interests .... Id.
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American tradition-demonstrates the effect the American legal
system has had on the development of the Israeli system in
recent decades.
The questions of whether adversarial legalism is appropriate
and whether there is a need to tame it are immense ones, and
they have been the subject of many articles. 413  Kagan is right
when he recognizes that "American adversarial legalism has both
positive and negative effects." 4 Kagan's bottom line is that
American legalism is more negative than positive.415 He argues
that "[bly making litigation and adjudication slow, very costly,
and unpredictable, adversarial legalism often transforms the civil
justice system into an engine of injustice, compelling litigants to
abandon just claims and defenses. 416
Good faith can be used to limit some of adversarial legalism's
negative effects, as reflected in class action litigation.41' A good
faith prerequisite will prevent the certification of dubious class
actions and in this sense will curb excessive litigation and unfair
settlements exacted by the threat of nuisance litigation.
Arguably, a good faith prerequisite is needed even more in
the United States than in Israel. While in the United States
class actions have been certified on a regular basis for many
years, in Israel, at least until the enactment of the ICAL,
certification of lawsuits as class actions was rare.418 Good faith
was originally integrated in Israeli legislation as a lesson from
the American experience, in which the court allegedly is not
allowed to examine the merits of the claim and the intentions of
"' See, e.g., Epp, supra note 341, at 273; Johnson, supra note 348, at 772-73;
Nelken, supra note 340, at 819; Sanders, supra note 348.
414 KAGAN, supra note 269, at 3.
411 See id. at 3, 9, 22-25.
416 Id. at 117.
417 The use of good faith may be appropriate even in legal systems that do not
share American adversarial legalism. In Japan, which is on the other side of the
spectrum in terms of litigation burden and other features of adversarial legalism, see
id. at 236-37, good faith is used to prevent the filing of lawsuits for the sole purpose
of harrasing the defendant or any other abuse of procedural right. See, e.g., Yasuhei
Taniguchi, Good Faith and Abuse of Procedural Rights in Japanese Civil Procedure,
8 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 167, 173-74 (2000).
418 From 1995 through 2000, less than thirty lawsuits were certified in Israel.
See Deutsch, supra note 236, at 310. On the other hand, between Feburary 1, 2008
and Feburary 1, 2009, eleven lawsuits were certified. See Ella Levi-Wienrib, Judges
Are Not Afraid from Corporations Anymore, GLOBES, Mar. 12, 2009, at 12. This
change stems from the enactment of the ICAL. See id. In the first quarter of 2009,
ten lawsuits were certified. See Sean, supra note 243, at 28-29.
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the plaintiff and class counsel.41 Moreover, the fact that in the
United States each party pays its own attorney fees enables more
risk neutrality and invites attorneys to abuse class action
proceedings.
The good faith principle goes hand in hand with the history
and social culture of the United States, a nation that values
individualism and restrains state control.4 20  The differences in
the role that litigation plays in American and Israeli societies is
not significant and, therefore, the adoption of a good faith
prerequisite, similar to the one used in Israel, is feasible.
VI. THE ADDITION OF A GOOD FAITH PREREQUISITE
Under the Israeli good faith prerequisite, courts examine the
motives of any plaintiff who files a class action and those of the
class counsel. The prerequisite also serves as a vehicle to
examine the motives of the parties presenting a class action
settlement for the court's approval and asking to certify the claim
as a class action only for this purpose. The consideration of both
the good faith of the plaintiffs and the chances of success of the
lawsuit enable Israeli courts to frustrate the certification of
unsuitable class actions.
Most issues that fall under the good faith prerequisite in
Israel are dealt with in the United States under the "adequacy of
representation" prerequisite.421 Since Rule 23 does not include a
"chances of success" prerequisite-which is now included in the
419 Goshen, supra note 236, at 413-14.
421 See Michael Dominic Meuti, Legalistic Individualism: An Alternative
Analysis of Kagan's Adversarial Legalism, 27 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 319,
343-45 (2004) (explaining that applying the American principles as an individualist
society to adversarial legalism best exposes that system's shortcomings); Derek C.
Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practice and Training, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 570, 575
(1983) ("At bottom, [America] is a society built on individualism, competition, and
success.").
421 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4), (g)(1)(A)-(B); see, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968).
[A]n essential concomitant of adequate representation is that the party's
attorney be qualified, experienced and generally able to conduct the
proposed litigation. Additionally, it is necessary to eliminate so far as
possible the likelihood that the litigants are involved in a collusive lawsuit
or that plaintiff has interests antagonistic to those of the remainder of the
class.
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ICAL 42 2-the need for a good faith requirement is even more
evident.4 23 Without examining the chances of success, the court
has limited tools, at least de jure, to make sure the lawsuit is not
frivolous.
As discussed above, the adequacy of representation
prerequisite examines whether any substantial conflicts of
interest exist between the plaintiff and the class and whether the
plaintiff will adequately prosecute the claim. This includes
examining the vigor and competency of the representation by
both the class representative and the proposed class counsel.4 24
The hypothetical argument would be that plaintiffs who lack
good faith will not adequately represent the interests of the class.
A. Is the Addition of a Good Faith Prerequisite Appropriate?
Some commentators have argued that the most important
safeguard from class action abuse is the requirement that the
class representative adequately represent the interests of the
class.425 Yet others have argued that the "adequacy" requirement
is not enough in order to curb class action abuse,426 an alignment
of interests is not enough, 427 and a heightened duty of loyalty is
needed.428 Congress agreed and therefore enacted legislation-
the declared purpose of which was to curb class action abuse.
422 This was not the case before the 2006 enactment of the ICAL, when some of
the subject-matter-specific laws did not include a "chances of success" prerequisite.
See supra text accompanying note 187.
423 As mentioned above, some federal courts now address issues involving the
merits of the claim, as long as it is required, in order to verify that Rule 23
requirements have been met. See supra text accompanying notes 126-129. To be
sure, this new approach does not enable courts to assess the chances of success of the
claim in the full sense of it. To argue otherwise would be to contradict the Eisen
decision.
424 See, e.g., Bassett, supra note 91, at 948-49.
12' E.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, An Introduction to Class Action Procedure in
the United States, in Debates over Group Litigation in Comparative
Perspective (July 21-22, 2000), http://www.law.duke.edu/grouplit/papers/classaction
alexander.pdf.
426 See, e.g., David J. Kahne, Curbing the Abuser, Not the Abuse: A Call for
Greater Professional Accountability and Stricter Ethical Guidelines for Class
Action Lawyers, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 741, 744 (2006); Koniak, supra note 282,
at 1115-16.
427 See Coffee, supra note 52, at 378, 402.
428 See id. at 378; Robert H. Klonoff, The Judiciary's Flawed Application of Rule
23's "Adequacy of Representation" Requirement, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 671, 673
("[T]he vast majority of courts conduct virtually no gate-keeping function and
approve class representatives and class counsel with little or no analysis.").
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Moreover, the "adequacy" prerequisite already includes the
problem of structural conflicts of interest,429 the question of
competency, and performance of class counsel and the
representative plaintiff.4 31 Using the same "adequacy"
prerequisite to deal also with such good faith issues as frivolous
or extortionate class actions and sweetheart settlements is just
too much. Borrowing from Issacharoff and Nagareda, adequate
representation is used today "as both a floor wax and a dessert
topping. 431  The use of the same terminology for all manner of
representational shortcomings causes the parameters of the
adequacy of representation prerequisite to remain ill-defined.
Previous Parts of this Article showed that Rule 23
prerequisites deal with problems that are addressed in Israel
under the good faith prerequisite in a less than perfect manner.
Thus, the addition of a good faith prerequisite seems appealing.
However, a few arguments can be raised against this suggestion.
It is possible to argue that adding a good faith prerequisite would
obfuscate and overlap with some of the existing threshold
requirements. This argument is not convincing. First, possible
overlap can be prevented if the court interprets good faith in a
way that would not collide with other prerequisites. Second, the
same argument can be leveled against existing prerequisites.432
Third, the sending of a clear message to all the relevant parties
that they are required to act in good faith-starting with the
class action plaintiff and the class defendants, through their
attorneys, and including the court trying the case433-does not
429 See Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class
Actions, 1999 SuP. CT. REV. 337, 343 (enumerating some of the conflicts of interest
inherent in the structure of a plaintiff class in the context of asbestos litigation).
430 Issacharoff and Nagareda refer to another use of "adequate representation"
in connection with "the personal jurisdiction of the ... court [that initially approves
a settlement] over class members who otherwise lack 'minimum contacts' with the
forum." See Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 64, at 1657. The Supreme Court has
also noted a connection between adequate representation and due process. See
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985).
411 Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 64, at 1657.
... See Coffee & Paulovic, supra note 101, at S-787 (noting that the
"commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to merge"); NEWBERG &
CONTE, supra note 73, § 3.41 (discussing the overlapping of the typicality and
adequacy requirements).
"" As Judge Posner has articulated in Reynolds, the trial judge-like the class
counsel and class representative-is a fiduciary of nonparticipating class members.
As such, the court is also obligated to act in good faith while managing class action
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undermine the status of the other prerequisites for the
certification of the class action, and it does not create any
confusion or overlapping.4 34  Quite the contrary is true: It
contributes to the sharpening of the need for clean hands,
maintaining fairness, conducting proceedings for genuine reasons
and not for ulterior motives, and marks out the standard
required in the whole procedure. Where there are special
circumstances, there is a need for special emphasis; where there
are special risks, there is a need for appropriate safeguards. At
least for now, the measures taken by Congress have not achieved
their purposes and, in some cases, have damaged the use of class
actions and decreased the enforcement of the law through private
litigation.
Another argument that could be raised against a more
frequent use of good faith is that it would lead to inconsistent
results. No matter what words are used to articulate good faith,
arguably the application of good faith to different facts by
different judges will yield inconsistent results. Be that as it may,
similar allegations could be made against the use of many other
more "fluid" or "vague" concepts and doctrines-such as
"equality" and "reasonableness"--that are widely used in the
United States and other legal systems.43
Indeed, the content that should be given to good faith in the
particular context of class actions should be investigated further.
For now it suffices to specify two arguments: First, the contents
of the good faith norm in litigation proceedings must be different
from the use of that norm in contractual matters. Application of
the good faith norm in the law of contracts is perceived as an
expression of subjugating the parties to a contract to the values
of mutual trust, solidarity, and cooperation. On the other hand,
the starting assumption in civil procedure is the opposite. In civil
procedure, the backdrop of good faith's application involves
proceedings, and more specifically when it conducts a certification hearing. Reynolds
v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279-280 (7th Cir. 2002).
... The assertion that the good faith prerequisite overlaps with other
prerequisites was raised and rejected by the Israeli Parliament. See SuB-COMMITTEE
PROTOCOL (Sept. 13, 2005), available at http://www.knesset.gov.il/AllSite/QGen
Txt.asp.
435 See, e.g., Oren Perez, The Institutionalisation of Inconsistency: From Fluid
Concepts to Random Walk, in PARADOXES AND INCONSISTENCIES IN THE LAW 119,
123 (Oren Perez & Gunther Teubner eds., 2006) ("Legal concepts are deeply fluid;
their boundaries and domain of application are highly malleable.").
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parties whose interests are inherently hostile towards each other
and, therefore, their behavior must be examined from the point of
view of opposing litigants. Second, even if good faith is not
accurately defined in advance, in most cases it is easily
recognizable vis-a-vis the specific facts of the case. Good faith is
a "standard," not a "rule. 436 Its flexibility enables judges to use
their discretion to give content to good faith according to the facts
of the case. Good faith, like other framing concepts, is used to
keep pace with changes in society and with varying
circumstances, which are hard to regulate with clear legal rules.
Clearly, more flexibility equals lower foreseeability. Yet, good
faith entails that a just outcome is reached in a particular
dispute. Moreover, the current form of the "adequacy"
requirement is also a "standard," which courts have used for
different purposes according to changing circumstances.
The more serious threat is that the good faith prerequisite
would be used to further erode the potential of class actions.
This could be done in a number of ways. First, judges may
strictly interpret a good faith prerequisite, which will then make
the certification of class actions difficult to an extent which might
discourage potentially meritorious claims. Courts that have a
negative view of the class action process may, therefore,
underestimate the need to effectively enforce provisions of the
law, and use good faith in order to prevent certification. Second,
courts that have reservations about certain class plaintiffs may
use the good faith requirement to make sure they are not
nominated as representative plaintiffs. Similarly, judges may
use good faith to not certify certain disfavored kinds of claims.437
Put differently, some courts may not make a good faith use of the
good faith concept. That, of course, is a breach of the fiduciary
.. See Menachem Mautner, Rules and Standards: Comments on the
Jurisprudence of Israel's New Civil Code, 17 MIStPATIM 321, 325 (1988) (discussing
how a standard is a norm that conditions a certain legal result by the realization of
the exercising of a criterion, which usually includes a certain value; thus, being
open-ended; and discussing how a rule is a norm that requires the realization of a
factual condition for a certain legal result); see also Issac Ehrlich & Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 258
(1974) (discussing the meaning of "rules" and "standards" in legal analysis).
117 Burbank argues that the Twombly decision can be used by the lower federal
courts to screen out complaints in disfavored classes of cases. Burbank, supra note
366, at 554 n.88, 560.
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duties of the court to the class.438 This threat will probably not
manifest itself, certainly not in a widespread manner. Indeed,
both CAFA and diversity jurisdiction grew out of a mistrust of
state court judges. 439 However, state courts, or federal courts for
that matter, are otherwise rarely suspected of consistently acting
in bad faith.44° Moreover, any remaining concerns should be
diminished by distilling the elements of good faith so as to
provide a reasonable prospect of appellate policing.441 Clearly, it
is advisable to set guidelines to limit the discretion of the court
and to ensure that class actions will not be dismissed without
good reasons.
B. How Should Good Faith Be Added?
Good faith could be added as a fifth prerequisite to
certification of class actions, as was done in Israel. However,
good faith can also be used by the courts without formally
changing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It can be applied
and incorporated under current prerequisites.
As Arthur Miller states, "[R]ule 23 really must be thought of
as a procedural skeleton requiring fleshing out by judges and
lawyers experimenting with it in an ever-increasing range of
41' See Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279-80 (7th Cir. 2002)
(noting that the court on direct review is "a fiduciary of the class, who is subject
therefore to the high duty of care that the law requires of fiduciaries"); In re General
Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 805 (3d Cir.
1995) (noting the "fiduciary responsibility" of the court in class settlement review);
see also Synfuel Techs. v. DHL Express, Inc., 463 F.3d 646, 652-53 (7th Cir. 2006)
(recognizing the "high duty of care" that characterizes the court's role as a fiduciary);
In re Wireless Tel. Fed. Cost Recovery Fees Litig., 396 F.3d 922, 932 (8th Cir. 2005)
(explaining the role of the court as a fiduciary); In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d
201, 231 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that the court acts as a fiduciary and guards the
rights of class members).
"' See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 336 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (stating that, pertaining to diversity jurisdiction, Congress "believed
that, consciously or otherwise, the courts of a state may favor their own citizens");
Howard M. Erichson, CAFA's Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
1593, 1597 (2008) ("At its core CAFA addresses subject matter jurisdiction, and to
the extent federal jurisdiction statutes involve mistrust, they ordinarily involve
mistrust of state judges.").
"I According to Burton, when a judge uses his or her discretion dishonestly or
maliciously, he or she is acting in bad faith. STEVEN J. BURTON, JUDGING IN GOOD
FAITH 90-91 (1992).
... A model for determining the appropriate content of the good faith
requirement in the relevant contexts will be offered in a forthcoming article.
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circumstances and in a variety of innovative ways. 44 2 The
obvious choice for the inclusion of a good faith consideration
would be the adequacy of representation prerequisite. As seen,
this option is not ideal and may cause the distortion of the
prerequisite. A better option is to use good faith without linkage
to any specific prerequisite. Both the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the good faith concept draw heavily on equity. 443
Therefore, it may be validly argued that good faith is entwined in
the process even if it is not explicitly mentioned in Rule 23.
Other questions, such as mootness of the claim and the
representative's membership in the class, have been addressed
by courts even though they are not mentioned in Rule 23.
The inherent power of courts to supervise and control
proceedings may also be used to address good faith issues. The
certifying court is a fiduciary of the class and, therefore, is
subject to the high duty of care that the law requires of
fiduciaries.445 As part of its duties, the court should check the
good faith of the plaintiff and class counsel. When examining a
settlement-only class action, the court also needs to address the
good faith of the defendant.
Even though all of these options may enable a more frequent
and less sporadic use of good faith within the certification
process, it is advisable to add good faith as a formal prerequisite.
This would ensure a more consistent and similar use of the
principle by different courts. It will enable a more refined and
precise use of the concept of good faith.
442 Miller, supra note 37, at 677; see also Owen M. Fiss, The Political Theory of
the Class Action, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 21, 29 (1996) (stating that the Supreme
Court is not bound by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "because the process by
which the federal rules were promulgated was unable to generate rules that might
be able to bind the court").
"I See, e.g., Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909,
912 (1987) ("That the Federal Rules and modern procedure draw heavily on equity is
not news."); see also Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 90-92, 118 N.E.
214, 214-15 (1917) (using good faith as a matter of equity to establish the existence
of a contract).
144 See, e.g., Stewart v. Winter, 669 F.2d 328, 334 (5th Cir. 1982).
... See Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 64, at 1707-08.
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CONCLUSION
Class action abuse can interfere with the legitimate business
activities of defendants who have not, in fact, violated the
legislation that the class action mechanism is designed to
enforce. Even though class actions facilitate law enforcement
and deter potential violators from future violation of the law,
they can also be abused and create substantial unwarranted
costs to the judiciary, defendants, and to society as a whole.
On the other hand, when the rights of a large number of
people are harmed, courts need to certify lawsuits as class
actions in the most efficient manner. This facilitates law
enforcement and deters potential violators from future violations
of the law.
This Article argues that the addition of a good faith
prerequisite to Rule 23 will help achieve a more efficient
enforcement of the law and, at the same time, prevent causing
harm to blameless defendants through abuse of the process. The
addition of a good faith prerequisite will send a message to both
defendants and plaintiffs. It will remind the latter that if they
bring a frivolous claim or use the class action procedure for
collateral purposes, they will have their claims dismissed. When
a plaintiff files a class action in bad faith or acts in bad faith after
the filing of the lawsuit, courts will be able to deny certification
or replace the named plaintiff or class counsel and, in the
appropriate cases, consider further sanctions. Unlike other
mechanisms that were created to prevent class action abuse, the
addition of a good faith prerequisite will protect defendants from
class action abuse, but will not operate to
bar meritorious class actions. The addition of a good faith
prerequisite will also send a message that the motives underlying
settlement-only class actions and other collusive agreements will
be consistently scrutinized.
The central argument of this Article is that the American
legal system would benefit from a consistent use of the good faith
concept in class action proceedings, as has been illustrated by an
analysis of the Israeli experience. This will benefit both plaintiffs
and defendants. Without good faith in the certification process,
courts' rulings may not achieve justice for the class. In other
cases, courts distort the operation of existing prerequisites in an
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attempt to reach a particular result, which may produce inequity
and unpredictability. Adopting a good faith prerequisite will
eliminate that mischief.
This Article does not argue that the addition of a good faith
prerequisite will completely eliminate class action abuse, for that
clearly cannot be the case. For one, it cannot adequately solve
the lack of monitoring of the class counsel by the representative
plaintiff. However, good faith will assist in maximizing the
potential of the class action mechanism and, at the same time,
will assist in minimizing the dangers of abuse. As shown in this
Article, most mechanisms created to protect against class action
abuse do not pass muster and cannot solve the problems which
were solved in Israel via good faith. Some of these mechanisms
are not used properly, others cannot deter procedure abusers,
and some have also caused the removal of meritorious class
actions, and hence, "thrown out the baby with the bath water."
Without radically changing contemporary class action practice,
good faith can substantially reduce the risks of frivolous class
actions, blackmail, and sweetheart settlements. The addition of
a good faith prerequisite may also enable courts to abandon some
of those mechanisms, which frequently cause the removal
of meritorious claims. This position will encourage potential
plaintiffs to file claims on the one hand, and will keep frivolous
class actions and collusive settlements outside of courts on the
other.
The Israeli experience with the good faith prerequisite,
beginning in 1988, demonstrates that a good faith prerequisite
can promote the purposes of class action proceedings. Worthy
class actions facilitate access to courts in a society that depends
upon private litigation for the enforcement of important social
norms. Good faith class actions will deter the breach of the law
and encourage compliance with legal norms. Class actions filed
in bad faith, on the other hand, thwart two of the main goals of
class action proceedings: enforcement of the law and deterring its
breach. Class actions filed in bad faith also over-burdened the
courts and adversely affected innocent defendants.
As the Israeli experience illustrates, the good faith
prerequisite adds value when used as a condition precedent for
the certification of a class action. Israeli courts are able to deny
certification of claims-which were frivolous or where the
motives for filing the claim were improper-without the need to
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distort other prerequisites to do so. In general, most Israeli
courts provide coherent interpretations of the good faith
prerequisite, and doubts pertaining to the unpredictability of
certification decisions have been found to be unwarranted.
This Article argues that litigation has a fundamental role in
both Israeli and American societies. Both legal systems rely
upon private litigants to enforce substantive provisions of law
that in civil law legal systems are left mostly to the discretion of
public enforcement agencies. The limited differences between the
legal systems should not prevent the transplant of good faith in
federal class action proceedings. Quite the opposite is true: A
good faith prerequisite is needed even more in the United States
than in Israel to tame class action abuse.
The addition of a good faith prerequisite will enable the
courts to better scrutinize unworthy representative plaintiffs and
class counsel and inappropriate settlement agreements. So
equipped, judges would have no need to strain and manipulate
existing prerequisites. With good faith explicitly adopted, judges
would have the legal support they require.
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